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ABSTRACT 
Courts struggle with the tension between national competition laws, on the one 
hand, and state and local regulation, on the other – especially as traditional governmental 
functions are privatized and as economic regulation advances beyond its traditional role 
to address market monitoring.  This Article defends a process-based account of the state 
action antitrust exception against alternative interpretations, such as the substantive 
efficiency preemption approach recently advanced by Richard Squire, and elaborates on 
what such a process-based account would entail for courts addressing the role of state 
economic regulation as a defense in antitrust cases.  It recasts the debate as focused 
around delegation issues and judicial deference to regulation – traditionally issues of 
administrative law.  State action antitrust exception issues frequently are invoked where 
state officials fail to act or only act partially to regulate, as is increasingly common where 
states privatize governmental functions or attempt to deregulate, or implement 
competition policies of their own.  As I shall argue, in such contexts a delegation model, 
which focuses on the conditions under which state legislative bodies have made 
delegations, whether agency regulators have standards, and the reasons provided by state 
and local officials for regulatory inaction, provides a more powerful and principled 
approach for evaluating the interaction between regulation and antitrust litigation than 
alternative approaches.   
 
A process-based account of the state action exception recognizes federalism and 
efficiency as important values, but changes the primary emphasis of the judicial inquiry.  
Federalism values and economic efficiency may well be advanced by applications of the 
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state action exception, but that does not require courts to ground their decisions in 
individual cases entirely on federal preemption legal analysis or on an assessment of the 
substantive efficiency of state or local regulation.  On a process-based account, 
federalism goals could be advanced by state and local political processes as much as by 
federal courts attempting to identify and apply the substantive values in broad federal 
statutes such as the Sherman Act.  Moreover, a process-based account of antitrust 
defenses, such as the state action exception, recognizes the possibility that economic 
efficiency can inform the application of the substantive standards of antitrust law without 
requiring economic efficiency to be the primary focus in evaluating every governmental 
program, particularly at the state and local level.  By discouraging courts from directly 
addressing economic efficiency concerns before addressing the merits of an antitrust 
violation, such an approach promotes judicial economy and, if properly cabined, can also 
have a positive effect on the behavior of private groups in the lawmaking process.  Even 
within alternative accounts that give priority to federalism or economic efficiency, the 
delegation approach should be used to inform the evidentiary assessment of procedure, 
serving as predicate any judicial decision to extend a state action antitrust exception. 
 
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I discusses the problems with current 
formulations and applications of the antitrust state action exception, which no one finds 
satisfactory.  As I argue, traditional approaches, such as a federal preemption-oriented 
understanding of state action doctrine, have serious limitations given a state and local 
regulatory environment that is increasingly characterized by regulatory transition and 
inaction.  Part II introduces Chevron, the predominant paradigm for judicial review of 
regulation in administrative law, highlighting its delegation structure and aspects of it that 
are useful to understanding the problems state regulation present for antitrust law.  Part 
III explains limits to the analogy between Chevron step one and the clear articulation 
requirement for antitrust state action.  Part IV draws an analogy to step two of Chevron 
and analyzes the implications of recasting the state action antitrust exception to focus on 
agency reasons, not power or history.  The Article concludes by addressing the kinds of 
reasons that should suffice for purposes of addressing active regulatory supervision at the 
state and local level as a predicate to extending an antitrust state action exception. 
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ANTITRUST PROCESS AND VERTICAL DEFERENCE:
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATE REGULATORY INACTION 
In adopting federal antitrust statutes, Congress has consistently failed to address 
how national competition rules will coexist with state or local regulation.  Recognizing 
that Congress could not have intended blanket preemption of state or local regulation, the 
U.S. Supreme Court created an antitrust state action exception in Parker v. Brown, a 1943
case rejecting a Sherman Act challenge to a California raisin producer prorate marketing 
program brought by a grower because the program derived “its authority and its efficacy 
from the legislative command of the state.”1 Over recent decades courts have routinely 
invoked the state action exception to reject federal antitrust claims2 J so much so that in 
early 2007 the Antitrust Modernization Commission included among its initial 
recommendations a finding that lower courts have interpreted the defense far too 
broadly,3 echoing an earlier conclusion by the Federal Trade Commission.4
1 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943). 
2 See infra notes 67-108 and accompanying text (describing cases from the Eighth, Tenth 
and Eleventh Circuits); infra notes 39-44 and notes 213-15 and accompanying text 
(describing U.S. Supreme Court missteps). 
3 See Antitrust Modernization Commission, Tentative Recommendations for January 11, 
2007 Meeting, available at 
http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/list_of_recommendations_jan_11v3.pdf. The 
Antitrust Modernization Commission was created by Congress in 2002 to study the need 
for and to submit proposals to modernize federal antitrust law.  Pub. L. 107-273, 116 Stat. 
1758 (November 2, 2002). 
4 A 2003 Federal Trade Commission report concludes that courts rely too heavily on the 
doctrine and “the state action doctrine has come to pose a serious impediment to 
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While Parker was born of an “era of exceptional confidence in government,”5
skepticism about regulation and the process from which it evolves has grown.  For 
example, public choice theory highlights how the incentives surrounding the lawmaking 
process diverge from the public interest where state and local regulation are at issue.6
Recognizing such concerns, the modern doctrinal test for the antitrust state action 
exception, derived from California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 
Inc.7 (Midcal), places its primary focus on the delegation issue faced by a state legislature 
in adopting a regulatory program.  First, a court asks whether a state sovereign 
lawmaking body (i.e., a legislature) has clearly articulated a policy to allow the allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct.  Second, a court asks whether the governmental entity to whom 
authority has been delegated actively supervises the private conduct at issue.8
While delegation concerns seem central to the basic state action exception 
doctrine expressed in Midcal, attention to delegation issues is largely foreign to the 
predominant judicial applications of the doctrine as well as to academic accounts.  
Instead, the predominant accounts of the antitrust state action exception ground its 
purposes in federalism (or preemption based on substantive economic efficiency) – a 
 
achieving national competition policy goals.”See REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK 
FORCE 25 (September 2003) (by Todd J. Zywicki, Director of the FTC Office of Policy 
Planning) [hereinafter FTC STATE ACTION REPORT], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf.
5 John T. Delacourt & Todd J. Zywicki, The FTC and State Action: Evolving Views on the 
Proper Role of Government, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1075 (2005). 
6 For discussions, see infra text following note 45 (discussing how, as Madison 
recognized in Federalist No. 10, concerns with interest group exploitation are heightened 
the more local the lawmaking process). 
7 California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 455 U.S. 97 (1980). 
8 Id. at 105. 
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view advanced by Frank Easterbrook9 and, more recently, Richard Squire10 J or on a
more policy-oriented balance between markets and regulation J advocated by scholars 
such as Daniel Gifford.11 In contrast, Einer Elhauge has proposed to understand the 
antitrust state action exception through a political “process-based” lens – an account that 
has much abstract appeal but has not exactly resulted in useful practical wisdom for 
courts in the fifteen years since its articulation.12 
This Article urges a fundamental reorientation of state action doctrine in antitrust 
law.  I defend a process-based account of the state action exception against alternative 
interpretations, such as the substantive efficiency preemption approach recently advanced 
by commentators such as Squire, and elaborate on what such a process-based account 
would entail for courts addressing the role of state economic regulation as a defense in 
antitrust cases.  In doing so, I recast the debate as focused around delegation issues and 
judicial deference to regulation – traditionally issues of administrative law.  State action 
antitrust exception issues frequently are invoked where state officials fail to act or only 
 
9 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. LAW &
ECON. 23 (1983) (emphasizing federalism aspects of the antitrust state action exception). 
10 Richard Squire argues that federal preemption principles should entirely “replace” the 
state action exception in antitrust law.  Richard Squire, Antitrust and the Supremacy 
Clause, 59 STAN. L. REV. 77, 79 (2006) (proposing to frame the state action exception 
entirely in federal preemption terms).   
11 See Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency, the Commerce Clause, and the Sherman 
Act:  Why We Should Follow a Consistent Free Market Policy, 44 EMORY L.J. 1227
(1995) (placing the antitrust emphasis on striking the balance between markets and 
regulation).  Increasingly, antitrust law and regulation are converging to present new 
doctrinal challenges for courts.  See Reza Dibadj, Saving Antitrust, 75 U. COLO. L. REV.
745, 747 (2004) (arguing that “as economic regulation has evolved it no longer makes 
sense to treat antitrust and regulation as separate bodies of doctrine--unified, they should 
form the building blocks of a new competition law.”). 
12 Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV. 667 (1991) 
(stating “the Court should recognize the process view that actually underlies its doctrine 
and, if it is going to decide cases based on that view, explicitly incorporate it into a rule 
of decision that better explains and fits its case law.”). 
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act partially to regulate (as is increasingly common where states privatize governmental 
functions), implement industry-wide settlements (as in the context of the tobacco 
industry), or attempt to implement competition policies of their own (as is commonly 
referred to as “deregulation”).  As I shall argue, in such contexts a delegation model, 
which focuses on the conditions under which state legislative bodies have made 
delegations, whether regulators have standards, and the reasons provided by state and 
local officials for regulatory inaction, provides a more powerful and principled approach 
for evaluating the interaction between regulation and antitrust litigation than alternative 
approaches.  In making a decision to extend the state action exception, a federal court is 
allowing a state legislature to delegate to state regulators the discretion to opt out of 
federal antitrust laws.  Of course, courts are willing to allow federal agencies to exercise 
discretion pursuant to broad legislative delegations, but typically only when subject to 
judicial review for reasonableness.  By an analogy, it is entirely appropriate, and 
normatively desirable, for a federal court to impose a similar condition on state legislative 
delegations to a state agency, subjecting these to arbitrary and capricious review prior to 
suspending national competition laws.  
The delegation-based approach to this question leaves room for federal courts to 
defer to traditional state regulatory schemes, such as cost-of-service regulation.  It also 
challenges courts confronted with new regulatory approaches to develop a more nuanced 
approach to deciding the extent to which federal law – in particular, the Sherman Act – 
preempts state regulation.13 A process-based account of the state action exception 
 
13 For the general argument that the issue of state action exception under the antitrust 
laws is a type of federal preemption inquiry, see Squire, supra note 10.  Squire’s 
argument understands the judicial decision to extend a state action antitrust exemption as 
ANTITRUST PROCESS AND VERTICAL DEFERENCE 
- 5 -
recognizes federalism and efficiency as important values, but changes the primary 
emphasis of the judicial inquiry.  Federalism values and economic efficiency may well be 
advanced by applications of the state action exception, but that does not require courts to 
ground their decisions in individual cases entirely on federal preemption legal analysis or 
on an assessment of the substantive efficiency of state or local regulation.  On a process-
based account, federalism goals could be advanced by state and local political processes 
as much as by federal courts attempting to identify and apply the substantive values in 
broad federal statutes such as the Sherman Act.  Moreover, a process-based account of 
antitrust defenses, such as the state action exception, recognizes the possibility that 
economic efficiency can inform the application of the substantive standards of antitrust 
law without requiring economic efficiency to be the primary focus in evaluating every 
governmental program, particularly at the state and local level.14 By discouraging courts 
from directly addressing economic efficiency concerns before addressing the merits of an 
antitrust violation, such an approach promotes judicial economy and, if properly cabined, 
can also have a positive effect on the behavior of private groups in the lawmaking 
process.  Even within alternative accounts that give priority to federalism or economic 
efficiency, the delegation approach should be used to inform the evidentiary assessment 
 
based on an assessment of articulated and unarticulated substantive regulatory goals at 
the state level and their conflict with federal antitrust law goals.  However, consistent 
with the application of Chevron to federal agencies, my approach focuses primarily on 
state regulators’ processes and pre-articulated reasons for their decisions, not their 
substantive regulatory goals as determined by federal courts.  Further, my approach does 
not propose to replace the state action exception with a federal preemption inquiry, but to 
refine its application.  Thus, to the extent my approach is preemption-oriented, it is a 
process-based preemption approach. 
14 There is substantial evidence that the framers of the Sherman Act, who were willing to 
allow many inefficient state and local regulations to stand, simply did not have powerful 
substantive definitions of efficiency in mind as a basis for preempting state or local 
regulation.  See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text. 
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of procedure, serving as predicate to any judicial decision to extend a state action 
antitrust exception. 
At its core, the state action antitrust exception focuses on the conditions under 
which it is appropriate for federal courts to defer to state regulators – a kind of vertical 
deference in antitrust law.  However, antitrust law and scholarship ignore that 
administrative law has its own well-settled approach to determining when it is 
appropriate for a federal court to defer to federal regulators – a type of horizontal 
deference.  The Chevron test provides the predominant paradigm for federal courts 
reviewing matters of agency statutory interpretation.  In applying the Chevron test, a 
court will typically engage in a two-part inquiry:  first, a court asks whether a statute is 
clear and unambiguous in addressing the issue in question; second, to the extent a court 
deems to the statute to be unclear or ambiguous, the court typically defers to an agency’s 
reasonable interpretation under the statute.15 In contrast to Midcal’s approach to the state 
action antitrust doctrine, in addressing deference issues under Chevron a court does not 
always get to the second inquiry.  However, where a statute is ambiguous, the Chevron 
step two inquiry – deference to an agency’s reasoned interpretation J is generally 
appropriate.16 While an appeal to Chevron deference alone provides an unsatisfactory 
(and, in my view, impoverished) way of thinking about vertical deference issues in 
antitrust law,17 an emphasis on delegation issues at Chevron’s step two, and especially 
 
15 Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984). 
16 Id. at 843-44. 
17 There are, for example, those who argue from both the left and the right for strong 
deference at step two of Chevron as recognizing the constitutional values of the unitary 
executive.  See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 
2251 (2001) (arguing that delegation to agency officials authorizes the President to 
ANTITRUST PROCESS AND VERTICAL DEFERENCE 
- 7 -
the presence of standards to constrain and guide the exercise of discretion, provides a 
particularly powerful set of guideposts for addressing state action exception cases.18 
First, a delegation-oriented approach to state action doctrine helps courts to focus 
on the core process questions at issue in evaluating whether a state legislative body has a 
clearly articulated policy in making the delegation, if any.  As I shall argue, Midcal’s 
clear articulation requirement, like step one of Chevron, can be framed as a type of 
penalty default rule designed to promote clarity in lawmaking and to deter interest groups 
from promoting, and lawmakers from adopting, ambiguous laws that purport to make 
excessively broad delegations to regulators.  In applying Midcal, many courts extending 
the state action exception have expansively interpreted state and local statutes – making 
their own determinations of whether acceptance of anticompetitive conduct is required by 
regulators or may have been foreseen by lawmakers in making a delegation.  A 
 
manage executive interpretations); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive 
Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, n44 (1992) (claiming that “Chevron's democratic theory 
thesis appears to presuppose a unitary executive, i.e., an interpretation of separation of 
powers that would place all entities engaged in the execution of the law-including the so-
called independent regulatory agencies-under Presidential control.”); Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO.
L.J. 217, 333-35 (1994) (arguing that the unitary executive approach to Chevron, which 
would entitle the President’s interpretation of laws to the greatest deference, is the better 
interpretation).   
18 For a discussion of the delegation-based approach to Chevron, see Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 452 (2002) (suggesting that there are strong public choice rationales for 
requiring administrative standards in arbitrary and capricious review to address 
delegation-oriented concerns); Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to 
Administer the Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 (2006) (arguing that Chevron deference 
only extends to specifically assigned agency delegations, not to general delegations to the 
executive branch); see also Evan Criddle, Fiduciary Foundation of Administrative Law,
54 UCLA L. REV. 117, 153 (2006) (arguing that, like corporate law’s emphasis on 
fiduciary duties, administrative law, including Chevron, “calls upon courts to enforce 
agency duties in order to promote fidelity to agencies’ statutorily defined missions and 
the best interests of their beneficiaries.”). 
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delegation-oriented approach to state action doctrine warns federal courts against 
aggressively attributing purposes to state and local legislative delegations, particularly to 
the extent this encourages adverse levels of interest group lobbying in the state legislative 
process as a way of opting out of federal antitrust enforcement.  
Second, such an approach to state action doctrine views the evaluation of active 
supervision by state regulators (the second prong of Midcal) as a necessary evaluation of 
the reasons given by regulators J not as some sort of dispensable judicial test, or as an 
inquiry into mere agency power (i.e., whether the agency has jurisdiction) or history (i.e., 
what specific actions a regulator has taken in the past).  The core prescriptive 
recommendation is to frame active supervision as focusing not on power/jurisdiction or 
history/action per se, but on the nature and sufficiency of the reasons given by the 
regulator (akin to arbitrary and capricious review under Chevron step two).  Unlike 
judicial application of Chevron step-two deference in reviewing a federal agency, 
however, I argue that where there is a state legislative delegation to an agency in the 
antitrust context a court should always apply something more than mere deference and 
should review the regulator’s decisions for transparency, consistency, and pre-articulated 
criteria.  Indeed, the arguments for a delegation-based approach to deference are stronger 
in the context of vertical deference than in the context of federal courts reviewing federal 
agencies.  Given the specific interest group pathologies at issue in state and local political 
processes, and especially those large regulated firms are likely to exploit, the state action 
exception presents a more serious type of institutional problem than judicial review of the 
run-of-the-mill federal agency.  Such public choice concerns are less salient, and 
generally advise stronger deference to a regulator, when a court is reviewing a federal 
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agency’s interpretation of law under Chevron – even in instances where federalism issues 
are raised J because it is more difficult for private interest groups to exploit federal as 
opposed to state and local regulatory processes.19 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I discusses the problems with current 
formulations and applications of the antitrust state action exception, which no one finds 
satisfactory.  As I argue, traditional approaches, such as a federal preemption-oriented 
understanding of state action doctrine, have serious limitations given a state and local 
regulatory environment that is increasingly characterized by regulatory transition and 
inaction.  Part II introduces Chevron, the predominant paradigm for judicial review of 
regulation in administrative law, highlighting its delegation structure and aspects of it that 
are useful to understanding the problems state regulation present for antitrust law.  Part 
III explains limits to the analogy between Chevron step one and the clear articulation 
requirement for antitrust state action.  Part IV draws an analogy to step two of Chevron 
and analyzes the implications of recasting the state action antitrust exception to focus on 
agency reasons, not power or history.  The Article concludes by addressing the kinds of 
reasons should suffice for purposes of addressing active regulatory supervision at the 
state and local level as a predicate to extending an antitrust state action exception. 
 
19 Phil Weiser has suggested that federal courts apply Chevron deference to the decisions 
of state regulators applying the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Philip J. Weiser, 
Chevron, Cooperative Federalism and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1
(1999).  Weiser’s analysis focuses on the extent to which federal courts should defer to a 
state regulator’s decision regarding the meaning of federal law.  By contrast, in this 
Article I focus on the extent to which federal courts should defer to state regulators 
applying state law against the backdrop of the Sherman Act.  As I suggest below, 
whatever lessons one takes from Chevron in the context of the antitrust state action 
exception, strong deference for state regulators should not be the primary one.   
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While courts applying the antitrust state action exception have largely ignored 
reasons provided by state regulators, attention to reasoned decisionmaking holds promise 
to advance the accountability of state regulation J particularly where state regulatory 
decisions are intermittent or are focused on disclosure and monitoring, rather than routine 
regulatory oversight.  The Article concludes by elaborating on the kinds of reasons state 
or local regulators would need to provide prior to a court extending the state action 
antitrust exception where a regulator bans competition outright, where regulatory 
intervention is intermittent (such as in the context of market-based rates), or where 
regulation focuses on disclosure and monitoring.  Emphasizing such accountability in the 
state action antitrust exception context, I conclude, is not only desirable, but is consistent 
with the broader goals of antitrust law and superior to alternative accounts. 
 
I. ANTITRUST FEDERALISM AND VERTICAL DEFERENCE TO 
STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION 
Congress clearly has the power to preempt state regulation in adopting national 
competition policy laws, such as the Sherman Act.  However, in first recognizing the 
antitrust state action exception20 in Parker v. Brown,21 the Supreme Court acknowledged 
Congress had failed to preempt state law: 
 
20 Although a number of courts and commentators refer to “state action immunity” or the 
“state action exemption,” I eschew these labels to the defense.  “Immunity” implies that 
the same defense would apply to all firms within a single regulatory program, but that 
approach the defense loses its generality as the nature of regulation varies between firms, 
as it increasingly does in industries undergoing change.  In addition, the term 
“exemption” implies permanence to the decision to suspend antitrust laws, but changes in 
regulation in the same regulatory program or involving the same firm may necessitate 
changes in an antitrust defense.  Hence, throughout this Article I prefer the term “state 
action exception.” 
21 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
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We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which 
suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from 
activities directed by its legislature.  In a dual system of government in which, 
under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may 
constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a 
state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to 
Congress.22 
The approach of Parker treats a state legislative body as a “sovereign,”23 presumptively 
allowing it to regulate private conduct as it sees fit. 
But the presumption of legitimacy the antitrust laws afford state regulation is 
hardly absolute.  Parker also left open the possibility that state regulation could, in some 
instances, allow firms to engage in conduct that runs afoul of the Sherman Act.  For 
instance, a state cannot “give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by 
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful . . . .”24 
Significantly, the Court in Parker noted, in delegating its regulatory program the 
California legislature had established an extensive regulatory apparatus, including a 
public approval process and an enforcement mechanism: 
It is the state which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate 
program.  Although the organization of a prorate zone is proposed by producers, 
and a prorate program, approved by the Commission, must also be approved by 
referendum of producers, it is the state, acting through the Commission, which 
adopts the program and which enforces it with penal sanctions, in the execution of 
a governmental policy.25 
As Parker suggests, the state action antitrust exception first serves as a “filter” for 
judicial scrutiny of private conduct,26 furthering the federalism purpose of facilitating 
 
22 Id. at 350-51. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 351. 
25 Id at 352. 
26 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 39 (1984) (arguing 
that antitrust law should design filters “to screen out beneficent conduct and pass only 
practices that are likely to reduce output and increase price” and that it is necessary for 
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participation in the state regulatory process27 and, consequently, lending legitimacy to the 
development of regulation.28 Following the approach of Parker, which embraces a 
general presumption against preemption of state regulation under the Sherman Act, 
federal courts have frequently embraced strong judicial deference to state and local 
regulation in the state action context.29 
A. Preemption, Delegation and Midcal 
Parker embraced deference to state regulation on the rationale that the Sherman 
Act did not preempt the state’s regulatory approach.  An important recent article by 
Richard Squire argues that state action issues in antitrust cases can be understood entirely 
through the lens of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.30 Squire argues that 
federal preemption concerns should “replace” the state action exception.31 An extension 
of a state action antitrust exception is at core a refusal to extend federal preemption to 
 
courts to “establish rules, recognizing that one cost of decision by rule is occasional over- 
and under-breadth”). 
27 See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action 
Doctrine:  Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory 
Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203 (1997). 
28 The state action exception may also serve a judicial avoidance purpose, providing 
federal courts a way of disposing of complex and technical issues without having a 
binding impact on state law.  However, other legal doctrines, such as abstention (which 
advises federal courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction out of comity), adequately 
protect the precedent-creating risk of direct federal court review of state regulation.  City 
of Chicago v. Int’l College of Surgeons, 533 U.S. 156 (1997) (allowing federal court 
review of state regulatory law claims, notwithstanding that state law provided for 
deferential review, but leaving open possibility of a lower court applying abstention 
principles).  Abstention can be invoked where a federal court is making a decision that 
has a binding effect on state law.  By contrast, with antitrust litigation courts are not 
normally passing judgments on the merits of state regulation, but are focused on the 
merits of private conduct under federal law. 
29 This strong deference to state and local regulation is observed in the recent FTC 
analysis of the state action exception.  FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 4, at 2.  
30 Squire, supra note 10. 
31 Id. at 79. 
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state regulation.  As Parker made clear, however, states were not afforded a carte blanche 
to override the Sherman Act, although the case failed to provide a workable standard for 
determining when state laws were impermissible.32 For the first thirty five years of its 
existence, the state action exception was interpreted so as to allow a virtual type of state 
sovereign immunity, in which courts strongly deferred to state legislatures and regulators. 
Beginning in the 1980’s, however, the Supreme Court approved a more skeptical 
stance toward state and local regulation in antitrust law, questioning the deferential 
approach of Parker. In Midcal, the Court refused to extend the state action exception to 
California’s wine pricing scheme, which did not involve anything more than passive 
approval of prices.   In reaching this conclusion, Midcal articulated a two-part test to 
assist modern courts evaluating antitrust claims involving state regulation:  “First, the 
challenged restraint must be ‘one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as the 
state policy’;  second, the policy must be ‘actively supervised’ by the state itself.”33 This 
test seems simple enough.  Only if a state legislature expressly envisions monopolistic 
conduct and delegates authority to a governmental body to actively supervise such 
conduct will the conduct escape antitrust enforcement.  A court must be satisfied that 
both parts of the test have been met before extending the state action exception in an 
antitrust claim.   
In application, though, courts have struggled with state action antitrust doctrine, 
often because within a state different institutions take on various regulatory roles, and the 
nature of regulation varies so much from industry to industry.  While the state action 
 
32 See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text. 
33 California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 455 U.S. 97, 105 
(1980) (citation omitted). 
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exception might be intended to create a safe harbor for state or local political and 
regulatory processes, displacing courts as overseers of private monopolistic conduct, the 
judicial decisions addressing state action doctrine are hardly consistent or principled.  
The Supreme Court’s current approach to state action antitrust doctrine also seems to 
ignore how judicial deference in this context can increase incentives for rent seeking in 
ways that may prove harmful to social welfare in the state and local lawmaking process. 
The application of the state action exception in the context of local governments 
(such as municipal bodies) as opposed to states highlights the current judicial 
misadventure with the doctrine.34 In a short-lived line of cases the Supreme Court read 
state action doctrine narrowly in the context of municipal (as opposed to state) regulation.  
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder35 subjected municipal governments 
to antitrust enforcement for monopolistic conduct.  Speaking for the majority, Justice 
Brennan distinguished between states regulating as states – entitled to the state action 
defense under a federalism rationale – and political subdivisions – exempt from antitrust 
enforcement only insofar as they are implementing state policy, but not when they are 
acting as municipal governments only.36 The City of Boulder’s moratorium on cable 
 
34 Commentary on the applicability of state action immunity to local governments is 
robust. See, e.g., John Cirace, An Economic Analysis of the “State Municipal Action” 
Antitrust Cases, 61 TEX. L. REV. 481 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook, supra note 9 
(Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism); Glen O. Robinson, The Sherman Act as a 
Home Rule Charter: Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 2 S. CT. ECON.
REV. 131 (1983); Dan J. Gifford, The Antitrust State-Action Doctrine After Fisher v. 
Berkeley, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1257 (1986); Herbert Hovenkamp & John A Mackerron, 
Municipal Regulation and Federal Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 719 (1985); John 
E. Lopatka, State Action and Municipal Antitrust Immunity: An Economic Approach, 53
FORDHAM L. REV. 23 (1984); C. Paul Rogers, Municipal Antitrust Liability in a 
Federalist System, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L. REV. 305.
35 455 U.S. 40 (1982). 
36 Id. at 52-53. 
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television expansion was thus subject to antitrust challenge because Colorado, at the state 
level, had not clearly expressed a policy to regulate cable television; in fact, Justice 
Brennan thought it apparent that Colorado had no state-wide policy at all – that there was 
a suspicious gap in state regulation.37 City of Boulder correctly recognized that a 
reluctance to extend the state action exception from antitrust enforcement is justified in 
the context of municipal regulation, given the higher propensity for interest group 
exploitation of local, as opposed to state-wide, legislative processes.38 
A more recent line cases, however, departs from the municipal-state distinction in 
that Justice Brennan laid down in the context of cable television regulation.  In Town of 
Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, the Court abandoned the clear-articulation requirement in 
assessing municipal state action immunity.39 Instead, Justice Powell reasoned in his 
majority opinion, so long as a state confers permissive authority in general terms for a 
municipality to deal with a matter in the municipal government discretion this suffices to 
exclude the conduct from antitrust enforcement.  Thus, when the state of Wisconsin 
granted municipalities the authority to establish sewage treatment plants, this impliedly 
granted municipal government the power to make decisions about who would be served.  
Justice Powell recognized that municipalities may exercise “purely parochial public 
 
37 Id. at 54-55.  Justice Brennan was clear that “mere neutrality” (emphasis in original) by 
the state regarding municipal regulation does not suffice.  Instead, a “clear articulation 
and affirmative expression” to replace antitrust enforcement with regulation is necessary.  
Id. at 55.   
38 Reacting to the prospect of liability created by the City of Boulder case, Congress 
abolished money damage liability under the antitrust laws for municipalities, their 
officials, and private persons acting under the direction of local governments and their 
officials in the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984.  See H.R. Rep. No. 965, 98th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 18-19 (1984), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4602, 4619-20 (1984).  
Congress continued, however, to authorize antitrust liability for private conduct that is 
sanctioned or authorized by municipal governments. 
39 471 U.S. 34 (1985). 
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interests” which, at some level, could be subject to antitrust enforcement.40 However, in 
his view a state delegation to a municipal government alone is sufficient to meet the 
“clearly expressed and fully articulated” criterion of state action antitrust doctrine, thus 
exempting from antitrust enforcement a large range of municipal regulation. Under this 
approach, an “express mention” by a legislature of its intent to displace competition is not 
necessary (although perhaps it would be sufficient); instead, the Court suggests, what 
matters is that the allegedly anticompetitive conduct is a “foreseeable result” of the state 
policy.41 
In addition, at least in the original Midcal formulation, state action doctrine 
requires courts to determine how active and involved a regulatory scheme must be for 
purposes of deeming it “active supervision.”  In the Hallie case, however, the Supreme 
Court effectively abandoned the requirement of active state supervision, at least insofar 
as it applies to municipalities.42 In so holding, the Court explained that the purpose of the 
state supervision is to ensure that regulatory policies are pursued for public purposes and 
not to enrich private actors.  According to the Court, “Where a private party is engaging 
in the anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to further his own 
interests rather than the government interests of the state.”43 But, if a state has clearly 
authorized a municipality to act, the Court reasoned that there is no such problem.  
Instead, the “only real danger is that it will seek to further purely parochial public 
interests at the expense of more overriding state goals.”44 Thus, if some clear state 
 
40 Id. at 42-43. 
41 Id. at 41-42. 
42 Id. at 46-47. 
43 Id.
44 Id.
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authorization exists, either expressly or by virtue of foreseeable results, the Court held 
that there is no need to make a finding that the state actively supervises the municipality’s 
regulation of the private activity.   
While this approach envisions some judicial inquiry into the “foreseeable results” 
of policy adopted by a state legislative body, the Supreme Court has never defined 
exactly what such a divining of legislative intent would entail.45 Appellate courts 
following this approach frequently invoke the state action exception based almost 
exclusively on a clear legislative purpose, or a clear statement to allow the allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct.  Beyond this, however, they generally engage in judicial 
restraint, deferring to state regulation of public utility monopolies under the antitrust 
laws.  Agency deference has some inevitable appeal in a complex regulatory 
environment, but the Court’s relaxation of a state supervision requirement for 
municipalities is counterintuitive if not incoherent.  Since Madison’s Federalist No. 10, it 
has been recognized that state and local political processes are more susceptible to 
interest group exploitation than their federal counterpart.  The premise that municipal 
regulation is not likely to be exploited by private interests at the expense of the public 
good ignores the high risk of interest group rent seeking at the local level, where the 
incentives for ex ante lobbying of the regulator are perhaps strongest.  At the local level, 
the costs to firms of organizing and lobbying regulators are much lower than at the state 
level; in addition, at the state and local level, extreme interest groups are more likely to 
hold influence, while at the national level extreme groups are more likely to cancel each 
 
45 For a discussion of this aspect of Hallie, see Elizabeth Trujillo, State Action Antitrust 
Exemption Collides with Deregulation: Rehabilitating the Foreseeability Doctrine, 11
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 349 (2006). 
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other out.  Although the Court seems to embrace a federalism-based formalism as a 
rationale for deference to municipal regulation, this account of federalism proves too 
much.  It can result in state delegation to municipal governments with no strings attached, 
insulating private behavior at the local level from almost all antitrust enforcement.  
Further, it places focus on the mere formalistic articulation of state goals by a state body, 
without addressing their purpose.  States, as well as municipal governments, sometimes 
regulate in ways that allow private interests to place their own economic well-being 
ahead of the public good.  Allowing the law to insulate such private conduct from 
antitrust scrutiny may have serious consequences, especially in deregulated markets 
where municipal utilities providing electric, gas, telephone and cable service can readily 
subvert competition policies with little or no scrutiny. 
The Court’s state action exception cases in the context of municipal regulation 
view the clear-articulation and active-supervision requirements as converging into a one-
step foreseeability test, in which the judicial role is focused on divining legislative intent.  
Fortunately, a more recent case on the topic clarifies that the active-supervision 
requirement is alive and well as an independent criterion where what is at issue is the 
conduct of state, as opposed to municipal, regulators J although the Court’s decision also 
raises many questions about the scope of the application of this market to many private 
arrangements in deregulated markets.  In FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co. the Court 
addressed the extension of the state action exception to the rate setting activities of title 
insurance companies in several states.46 Most of the states regulating the title insurance 
defendants permitted private insurers to jointly file rates, which state officials could 
 
46 504 U.S. 621 (1992). 
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review or allow to remain in effect.47 The record of the case suggested that no significant 
review of the rates actually took place by these states.48 The FTC had conceded that the 
state statutes authorizing the acceptance of jointly filed rates met the clear-articulation 
requirement,49 but the also Court found the agency’s review did not constitute active 
supervision and thus failed the second step of Midcal.50 Hence, the Court concluded, the 
allegedly anticompetitive acts of the insurers could be challenged. 
The preemption recently advanced by Squire attempts to explain these and other 
cases as courts interpreting the Sherman Act to preempt the state regulatory program 
where the state approach seeks to confer monopoly profits on market participants by 
constricting output.  His approach would replace an independent state action antitrust 
exception with an inquiry into preemption that hinges on a federal court’s determination 
of the costs a state chooses to incur under state law.  As Squire explains: 
a state which takes control over market prices incurs costs the state could avoid if 
its only goal were to confer monopoly profits on producers. These costs are 
pricing distortions, higher administrative expenses, and constituency protest. A 
state's willingness to incur these costs thus suggests that the state's regulatory 
objectives do not clash with federal antirust policy. My proposed preemption 
doctrine therefore allows states to suspend price competition among producers if 
the state also steps in to set market prices.51 
Squire’s substantive preemption approach, which emphasizes the costs a state chooses to 
incur in its regulatory approach, provides a tidy explanation for why private conduct 
 
47 Id. at 629-31.   
48 In Wisconsin, for example, no rate hearings had occurred.  Id.
49 Id. at 631.  In the decision below the Third Circuit, following a First Circuit decision, 
held that the existence of a funded and authorized state program met the active-
supervision requirement.  Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. FTC, 922 F.2d 1122, 1140 (3rd Cir. 
1991), following New England Motor Rate Bureau, Inc. v. FTC, 908 F.2d 1064, 1071 (1st 
Cir. 1990). 
50 504 U.S. at 640. 
51 Squire, supra note 10, at 79. 
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sanctioned under traditional state price regulation – such as franchise and cost-of-service 
regulation of electric utilities – is generally not subject to antitrust attack.  His analysis 
would focus state action antitrust exception analysis entirely on whether a regulatory 
regime’s objectives conflict with the purposes of the Sherman Act; where they do, federal 
preemption – and antitrust enforcement – is appropriate.  His approach also implicitly 
assumes that the Sherman Act should be interpreted broadly given the public interest goal 
of protecting competition; hence, the presumption endorsed by Squire’s approach in 
generally in favor of preemption.52 
The substantive preemption approach may have some traction in explaining some 
of the twentieth century cases, but it is problematic in two main respects.  First, it 
assumes that in passing the Sherman Act, Congress intended that state and local 
regulation be understood as imposing costs.  There is no single, fixed meaning to the 
open-ended terms of the Sherman Act.  Congress was focused on a wide range of broad 
goals in adopting the Sherman Act, including economic efficiency,53 protecting consumer 
welfare,54 preserving competition,55 and protecting the political process from dominance 
by large corporate interests.56 However, there is no evidence that Congress adopted such 
a strong efficiency understanding of antitrust enforcement in the Sherman Act that would 
 
52 As Squire states, “the required limitations must reflect the Act's general purpose to 
prevent marketplace wealth transfers from consumers to producers, and yet must honor 
Congress's additional mandate that rules of antitrust be more deferential to state 
lawmakers than they are to market participants.”  Id at 107. 
53 See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 90-91, 110-12 (1978). 
54 See, e.g., Robert H. Land, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of 
Antitrust:  The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HAST. L.J. 65 (1982). 
55 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 42 
(2005). 
56 See, e.g., Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 
1053-58 (1979). 
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condemn state regulation of a wide range of activities at the time as problematic in any 
way – especially based on its costs.  There is substantial evidence, by contrast, that 
Congress intended to leave in place a broad range of state regulation and to leave the 
evaluation of the appropriateness of future state and local regulation to the courts.57 At 
the time Congress adopted the Sherman Act, state and local governments widely accepted 
regulation of a variety of private activities, including grain rate setting, bridge tolls, 
sewage regulation, railroad regulation, and other regulatory approaches than ranged from 
bans on prostitution to state and local taxes and rent control.  There is also substantial 
evidence that the drafters and primary sponsors of the Sherman Act were focused 
primarily on the evil of the pursuit of “greed” by the few at the expense of the many.  
According to Senator Hoar, a member of the Judiciary Committee that drafted the final 
version of the Sherman Act: 
When . . . we are dealing with one of . . . the combinations aimed at chiefly by 
this bill, we are dealing with a transaction the only purpose of which is to extort 
from the community, monopolize, segregate, and apply to individual use, for the 
purposes of individual greed, wealth which ought properly and lawfully and for 
the public interest to be generally diffused over the whole community.58 
As Elhauge has indicated in his survey of the history surrounding adoption of the 
Sherman Act, “Not once did a congressman condemn a restraint imposed by financially 
disinterested actors,” such as state or local regulators.59 
57 See 21 Cong. Rec. 2460 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman) ("I admit that it is difficult 
to define in legal language the precise line between lawful and unlawful combinations. 
This must be left for the courts to determine in each particular case."); id. at 4099 (Rep. 
Bland); id. at 4089 (Rep. Culberson); id. at 3148 (Sen. Edmunds); id. at 2558 (Sen. 
Turpie).  
58 21 Cong. Rec. 2728 (1890). 
59 Elhauge, supra note 12, at 700. 
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Second, in application, a substantive preemption approach focused on the costs of 
state and local regulation answers none of the difficult questions courts confront today in 
state action immunity cases.  Put simply, it does not provide a workable set of standards 
for courts to decide modern state action exception issues, especially those of the type that 
that the FTC has recently identified as being of concern.60 At core, as recent state action 
exception cases illustrate, issues of delegation within state governments are as significant 
to judicial decisions to extend antitrust exceptions as pure assessment of the substantive 
purposes of antitrust law or economic efficiency.  In deciding to extend state action 
immunity, modern courts focus not only on substantive preemption principles, but also 
pay attention to the procedures under which a state regulator makes its decision.  The 
delegation inquiry in state action exception cases provides an especially useful set of 
tools for courts in addressing problems of extending antitrust laws to private conduct that 
is sanctioned through regulatory inaction in industries undergoing change.   
Indeed, a purely substantive preemption approach must confront how state 
regulators still may be entitled to deference notwithstanding ambiguity under the 
Sherman Act.  The Supreme Court’s longstanding presumption against preemption – an 
interpretive canon that reflects a desire to protect state regulatory processes and state and 
local sovereignty – advises strongly against allowing state regulation to ever take priority 
over the Sherman Act.61 As a general matter, the Court requires a “clear statement” or 
other strong evidence of a “clear and manifest purpose of Congress” before finding a 
 
60 See FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 4, at 34-36 (discussing the problem of 
broad regulatory regimes). 
61 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). 
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state law is preempted.62 If such a presumption were to apply explicitly in the context of 
antitrust law, the judicial decision reflected in state action antitrust doctrine would hinge 
on federal, not state, regulation.   
Squire’s response to this concern in defending a preemption-based understanding 
of state action is to read the Sherman Act broadly as national public interest legislation 
that ought to generally preempt narrowly crafted state and local laws63 – an approach that 
is generally consistent with others who take the Chicago School approach of reading the 
pro-competition policies of legislative ambiguity in the Sherman Act broadly while 
reading other kinds of legislation narrowly as interest-group legislation.64 This approach 
to statutory interpretation has some elegance and is particularly appealing to market-
oriented advocates of the Sherman Act.  It also does take into account some process-
based concerns in addressing the tension between state regulation and national 
competition laws.  But its fault is in giving state and local government short shrift as 
legitimate political bodies.  Even if it is acknowledged, as I believe it should be, that state 
and local decisions are more susceptible to interest group influence than federal 
 
62 Id. at 230.  See also Metronic v. Lohr, 519 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“[T]he purpose of 
Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case.”); Solid Waste Assocs. Of 
N. Cook County v. U.S. County of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001) (seeking 
congressional “clear statement” that agency was authorized to “invoke the outer limits” 
of congressional authority and commenting that “[t]his concern [about agency authority] 
is heightened where the administrative interpretation alters the federal-state framework 
by permitting federal encroachment on a traditional state power.”). 
63 See Squire, supra note 10, at 107.   
64 See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV.
213, 252-53 (1984).  This Chicago School approach, of course, borrows from a synthesis 
of Federalist No. 10 – in which James Madison famously cautioned about the interest 
group dynamics of lawmaking at the state and local level -- and the statutory 
interpretation insights of modern public choice theory – which favor broad interpretation 
of public interest statutes and narrow interpretation of interest group legislation.  See 
JERRY MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE (Yale U. Press 1996).   
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lawmaking, it does not follow that federal courts should condemn all state and local 
process and  presumptively favor an ambiguous national statute over them.   A process-
based approach to state action immunity has much more to lend to the analysis of 
whether state or local regulations give rise to an antitrust exception.  Specifically, it 
recognize that what happens within a state or local governmental unit – how regulator 
decisions are made and by whom J is significant to the decision to suspend application of 
the Sherman Act.   
In addition, it bears noting that, as a practical matter, courts applying the state 
action exception have failed to interpret state laws and local laws consistent with the 
Chicago School approach Squire urges.  Instead, against the implicit backdrop of the 
well-acknowledged presumption against preemption, courts have largely deferred to state 
and local regulators.  The siren song of vertical deference has had an overwhelming 
appeal to federal courts, even where it is clear that there is mischief in the works at the 
state and local level.  As a result, courts have extended the state action exception to many 
scenarios where it is not warranted, even under a substantive preemption approach based 
on the cost considerations that Squire emphasizes.   
For example, state and local regulators do not always adopt explicit and public 
regulatory programs with well-defined procedures, such as marketing referenda with 
enforcement mechanisms or cost-of-service hearings.  Instead, state and local regulators 
are increasingly drawing on different kinds of regulatory approaches – sometimes 
designed to restrict competition and sometimes designed to further it.  Some states have 
banned competition within the state in industries such as electric power, in which 
interstate competition is authorized (and perhaps even encouraged) by federal law.  Some 
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states have approved restraints between competitors that, unlike, the California raisin 
producer marketing program, are not voluntary and which do not contain clear 
enforcement mechanisms.  Some states have abolished cost-of-service hearings in favor 
of so called “market-based rates,” designed to further market-oriented goals.  In addition, 
states have increasingly looked to regulatory disclosure and enforcement regimes, which 
require firms to provide information to regulators but leave agencies significant 
discretion in deciding what to do with such information.65 Unlike some of the previous 
instances in which courts have expressed comfort with state regulation, such as state 
regulatory ratemaking proceedings, these new approaches challenge courts to seriously 
evaluate the effectiveness of state regulatory oversight.  To date, courts simply have not 
risen to the challenge presented by new approaches to regulation at the state and local 
level. 
B. The State Action Exception and Regulatory Inaction in Industries 
Undergoing Change 
 
65 In deregulated telecommunications markets, for example, it has been observed that the 
regulatory model has shifted from firm-specific cost-of-service hearings towards 
regulating industry structure through firm-specific tariffs and through ex ante rules for 
defining network access.  See Christopher S. Yoo, New Models of Regulation and 
Interagency Governance, 2003 M.S.U. L. REV. 701, 707 (2003) (noting that 
“policymakers have increasingly moved away from tariffs towards more flexible 
agreements negotiated on a customer-by-customer basis” and that regulators have 
increasingly begun to abandon classic rate regulation in favor of a new approach known 
as “access regulation”).  See also Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great 
Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1340-57, 1364-83 
(1998) (describing broader trends towards detariffing and access regulation across all 
regulated industries); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: 
Economic and Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 889-90, 960- 70, 
980-87, 1002-18 (2003) (describing access regulation in local telephony). 
65 Courts do so by making a determination that the allegedly anticompetitive conduct was 
either explicitly envisioned by, or foreseeable to, state legislators.  See supra notes 42-45 
(referencing the foreseeability approach). 
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Recent cases involving the antitrust state action exception, particularly in the 
deregulated electric power industry, illustrate the problem with the current judicial 
approach.  Since the state action exception serves a filter function for antitrust 
enforcement, as a routine defense in antitrust cases it increasingly plays an important role 
as formerly regulated firms are deregulated.66 Yet, according to most appellate courts, 
antitrust law’s enforcement gates remain closed, allowing the conduct of many private 
firms to escape antitrust scrutiny altogether in emerging competitive markets.  Despite 
Ticor’s signal that active supervision is alive and well as a judicial basis for evaluation, 
lower courts – especially the Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits J generally have 
continued to take a deferential approach to state action antitrust doctrine in reviewing 
state regulation in deregulated markets.  Even where what is at issue is state, not local, 
regulation and even where competitive markets for service are emerging, these courts are 
not inclined to allow the Sherman Act to apply to private conduct in formerly regulated 
industries where there is some state regulatory scheme, however incomplete it is.   
Illustrative of this deferential approach to judicial intervention, the Tenth Circuit 
has embraced particularly broad antitrust immunity for electric utilities, despite the 
introduction of competition to large segments of the industry.  For example, the Tenth 
Circuit extended a state action antitrust exemption to Oklahoma Gas and Electric 
Company’s (OG&E) conduct based on evidence that the state regulatory agency had 
“general supervision” authority over the utility, “including the power to fix all of 
OG&E’s rates for electricity and to promulgate all the rules and regulations that affect 
 
66 See Darren Bush, Mission Creep: Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities as Applied to 
Regulated Industries 2006 UTAH L. REV. 613; Jeffrey D. Schwartz, The Use of Antitrust 
State Action Doctrine in the Deregulated Electric Utility Industry 48 AM. U. L. REV.
1449 (1999).  
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OG&E’s services, operation, and management.”67 The Tenth Circuit deemed a state 
agency’s power to engage in rate review as itself sufficient for applying a state action 
antitrust exemption, effectively rendering the active-supervision requirement 
meaningless.  While the court cited a previous case which “found that the use of similar 
authority over an electric utility satisfied the active supervision requirement”68 as a basis 
for this conclusion, it made no effort whatsoever to discern evidence of the affirmative 
use of such authority by the regulator with respect to the utility whose conduct was at 
issue.69 Moreover, based on a review of the docket index for both the appellate and trial 
courts, there is no indication that the Oklahoma regulatory agency made a single filing in 
the trial or appellate case; it did not weigh in as amicus in the appeal to the Tenth Circuit, 
although Edison Electric Institute (EEI) (a nationwide industry association representing 
private utilities such as OG&E) filed an amicus brief.70 
67 Trigen-Oklahoma City Energy Corp. v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 244 F.3d 1220, 1226 
(10th Cir. 2001). 
68 Id. (citing Lease Light, Inc. v. Public Service Co. of Okla., 849 F.2d 1330, 1333 (10th 
Cir. 1988)). 
69 The case presents a notable contrast to a later Tenth Circuit case, in which the court 
refused to extend a state action exception to unilateral activity which was “not mandated, 
nor authorized, nor reviewed, nor even known about” by the state regulator.  Telecor 
Communications, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 305 F.3d 1124, 1140 (10th 
Cir. 2002).  This case is also too narrow in defining the limits of state action antitrust 
doctrine.  As is discussed infra, refusal to extend the state action exception should not be 
limited to purely “unilateral” activity, but should also extend to bilateral activity in which 
the regulator plays a passive role. 
70 This observation is based on a review of the docket indices available through Westlaw 
for both the appellate and trial court cases.  See 244 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(Westlaw hyperlink to “Briefs and Other Related Doctrines); 1999 WL 136900 (Westlaw 
hyperlink to “Briefs, Pleadings and Filings”). 
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The Eighth Circuit has taken a similarly deferential approach to the state action 
antitrust defense.71 North Star Steel, a customer located within the exclusive service 
territory of MidAmerican, an electric utility in Iowa, sought to purchase competitively 
priced electricity and requested that MidAmerican wheel power to it.72 MidAmerican 
refused, and North Star sued, alleging that the utility violated the antitrust laws by 
refusing to allow access to its transmission lines.73 The court found that active 
supervision of the utility’s conduct existed due to the fact that by Iowa statute new 
customers were assigned to exclusive service providers and, in the event there was a 
conflict over which provider was in control of a given area, the regulator determined 
which provider should “occupy” the area.74 The court found that Iowa’s legislature 
“affirmatively expressed” a policy of displacing competition in the market for retail 
electric service.75 The court refused, however, to explore the substantive basis for the 
agency’s regulatory determinations in defining exclusive service territories.   For 
instance, even though the state had experimented with limited “pilot” retail wheeling 
programs,76 the court did not evaluate how the state agency’s efforts to promote 
competition in power supply could coexist with maintaining exclusive service territories 
over transmission and distribution, effectively deferring to state regulators on all of these 
issues.  In fact, the only regulatory action that was discussed by the court related to the 
 
71 North Star Steel Co. v. MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co., 184 F.3d 732 (8th Cir. 
1999). 
72 Id. at 734.   
73 Id.
74 Id. at 734-35. 
75 Given a previous ruling by the Iowa Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit assumed for 
collateral estoppel purposes that “under Iowa law the exclusive service territory 
provisions include the generation of electricity for retail sales.”  Id. at 732. 
76 Id. at 736. 
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definition of distribution service territories, not the allocation of power supply or 
generation.  The court also reasoned that “less pervasive regulatory regimes have been 
held to satisfy the active supervision prong.”77 In this appeal, the Iowa Utilities Board 
filed an amicus brief before the Eighth Circuit discussing its regulatory approach,78 but 
the court did not address explicitly the issue of how much deference it should afford to 
the state regulator’s position. 
One of these “less pervasive” regulatory regimes is blanket state prohibitions – by 
statute or regulation J of certain types of pro-competitive conduct.  For example, 
according to Florida’s regulators and courts, Florida has adopted a statutory prohibition 
on retail electric competition, outside of self-wheeling arrangements.  Although Florida 
certainly does not have a clear legislative statement regarding the issue, Florida’s Public 
Service Commission (PSC) had adopted a regulation which prohibits retail wheeling to 
provide access to competitive power supply outside of “self-wheeling” arrangements 
(e.g., a supplier transmitting power over the utility’s lines for the supplier’s own use).  A 
Florida Supreme Court case had previously interpreted this regulation to preclude 
cogenerators from selling their power in the retail market.79 Accepting both the 
regulation and the Florida Supreme Court’s characterization of the regulation, the 
Eleventh Circuit applied the state action exemption to preclude an antitrust action by a 
cogeneration facility against a utility which refused to wheel power at a competitive 
 
77 Id. at 739. 
78 This observation is based on a review of the docket index available through Westlaw 
for the appellate case.  See id. (Westlaw hyperlink to “Briefs and Other Related 
Doctrines). 
79 PW Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1988) 
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rate.80 The court reasoned that “the doors to the PSC were open to all with standing to 
complain,”81 but nowhere did the court identify how a private cogenerator might raise 
such issues before the Florida PSC.  Arguably, it could not, other than by directly 
challenging the state agency regulation authorizing the allegedly anticompetitive conduct.  
The Florida PSC filed an amicus brief with the Eleventh Circuit, and the Eleventh Circuit 
agreed with the state regulator’s interpretation of Florida law,82 without discussing the 
issue of how much deference should be afforded the agency’s interpretation in its brief. 
A way of understanding the antitrust claim before the Eleventh Circuit was as a 
collateral attack on the state agency rule based on a substantive violation of federal 
antitrust law.  The decision echoes a previous Eleventh Circuit case, in which it was 
found that the state action defense protects a regulated electric utility’s division of service 
territories in the county in which a customer is located from Sherman Act restraint of 
trade claims.83 Taken together, these Eleventh Circuit opinions seem to suggest that the 
mere existence of an agency rule authorizing anticompetitive conduct is enough to trigger 
active supervision.84 If this holds, however, not only the actions of a state legislature can 
 
80 TEC Congeneration, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 76 F.3d 1560 (11th Cir. 1996). 
81 Id. at 1570. 
82 This observation is based on a review of the docket index available through Westlaw 
for the appellate case.  See id. (Westlaw hyperlink to “Briefs and Other Related 
Doctrines). 
83 Praxair, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 64 F.3d 609 (11th Cir. 1995). 
84 Id. at 613 (“An agency’s interpretation of its own regulations must be given controlling 
weight unless that interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with regulation.”).  
In an earlier case, the Eleventh Circuit relied entirely on the clear-articulation 
requirement to find a state action exception.  See Municipal Utilities Board of Albertville 
v. Alabama Power Co., 934 F.2d 1493 (11th Cir. 1991).  This seems to completely take 
the state action antitrust exception outside of the two part Midcal test, turning it into a 
one-step clear-articulation requirement.  In Southern Motors Carriers Rate Conference, 
Inc. v. U.S., 471 U.S. 48, 61-62 (1985), the Court stated:   
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insulate private conduct from antitrust liability; a unilaterally adopted agency rule can 
also excuse private conduct from antitrust enforcement, even if this rule prohibits pro-
competitive conduct with little or no agency oversight.  
This deferential approach to antitrust enforcement filtering by state regulatory 
agencies has serious implications for the enforcement of the antitrust laws in deregulated 
markets.  In California’s deregulated electric power market, wholesale power suppliers 
possessing market power have been alleged to have engaged in tacit collusion to withhold 
supply and to thus artificially inflate their prices.85 Of course, both federal and state 
regulation continued, even in the context of California’s failed regulation plan.  The 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) made its own determinations that 
individual firms lacked market power and had approved several market-based tariffs, 
allowing deregulation in the wholesale market.  As to California’s retail market, state 
agencies as well had approved the sale of power by these suppliers through the state-
sanctioned market exchange.86 To the extent that the behavior of any private firms 
operating in this market raised a plausible Section one (or even a Section two) antitrust 
 
The federal antitrust laws do not forbid the States to adopt policies that permit, 
but do not compel, anticompetitive conduct by regulated private parties. As long 
as the State clearly articulates its intent to adopt a permissive policy, the first 
prong of the Midcal test is satisfied. 
However, in the same opinion, the Court made it clear that the presence or absence of 
compulsion is not the “sine qua non to state action immunity.”  Id. at 60. 
85 See Darren Bush & Carrie Mayne, In (Reluctant) Defense of Enron:  Why Bad 
Regulation is to Blame for California’s Power Woes (Or Why Antitrust Law Fails to 
Protect Against Market Power When the Market Rules Encourage Its Use), 83 OR. L. 
REV. 207 (2004); Robert B. Martin, III, Sherman Shorts Out: The Dimming of Antitrust 
Enforcement in the California Electricity Crisis, 55 HAST. L.J. 271 (2003).  
86 For discussion of this regulatory framework, see Jim Rossi, The Electric Power 
Deregulation Fiasco: Looking to Regulatory Federalism to Promote a Balance Between 
Markets and the Provision of Public Goods, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1768 (2002). 
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claim under the Sherman Act, the mere existence of a state sanctioned and supervised 
market should not give rise to a state action exception.   
Judicial decisions that adopt this deferential approach send mixed signals and 
present a barrier to plaintiffs seeking to sue under the antitrust laws.  Still worse, these 
decisions invite private manipulation of state and local regulators to create antitrust 
immunity.  Particularly as state and local governments engage in lawmaking in partially 
deregulated markets, and move away from the standard regulatory process afforded in a 
public rate hearing, the risks of private manipulation of the policymaking process are 
heightened.87 Given this, courts could improve the functioning of deregulated markets, 
as well as the political process, if they could devise a more principled way of exercising 
their filter function in the state action exception context.  Since Hallie, the Supreme Court 
has abandoned the political process informed municipal-state distinction in assessing 
state action antitrust doctrine.  In place of this, federal courts embrace a highly deferential 
stance in reviewing both state and local regulation as they apply the state action exception 
to antitrust challenges to allegedly anticompetitive conduct.  If a state regulates an 
activity, courts reviewing private conduct under complex regulatory schemes are 
increasingly likely to imply a regulatory policy J sometimes even absent a clear 
articulation of regulatory purpose by the state.88 Especially given the strong background 
judicial preference for a presumption against preemption, the general approach strongly 
disfavors judicial intervention in applying the state action exception as an antitrust 
defense. 
 
87 See supra note 64. 
88 Courts do so by making a determination that the allegedly anticompetitive conduct was 
either explicitly envisioned by, or foreseeable to, state legislators.  See supra notes 42-45 
and accompanying text (referencing the foreseeability approach).  
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Many courts also imply the active-supervision prong of state action antitrust 
doctrine, limiting judicial intervention in many recent cases involving deregulated 
electric power markets, especially in the Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh circuits.  These 
courts consistently have failed to evaluate the degree of scrutiny provided by state or 
local regulators, as well as whether the purpose of this supervision overlaps with the pro-
competitive goals of the Sherman Act.  Their approach evinces a serious lapse of the 
judicial filtering function in the consideration of antitrust challenges to private conduct in 
restructured industries, such as electric power and telecommunications.  Without a 
judicial safeguard, overbroad judicial endorsement of the state action exception  allows 
allegedly anticompetitive private conduct to escape scrutiny altogether and risks 
undermining the goals of competition law, particularly as national markets in these 
industries develop.  In recognition of this serious problem, Easterbrook89 and Squire,90 
along with many other scholars, including John Shepard Wiley, 91 Matthew Spitzer,92 and 
 
89 See supra note 9. 
90 See supra note 10. 
91 Responding to Hallie, John Shepard Wiley proposes that courts directly address the 
efficiency, and in particular public choice, implications of state and local legislation in 
deciding whether to accept an antitrust state action defense.  John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A
Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713. (1986).  According to 
Wiley, if anticompetitive legislation is inefficient and the result of producer-interest 
lobbying, the state action defense should not shield conduct authorized under the 
legislation from scrutiny under the Sherman Act.  Id. at 788-89. 
92 Matthew Spitzer argues that federal courts should intervene in evaluating antitrust 
claims notwithstanding state or local legislation, if the legislation is inefficient or 
transfers wealth from consumers to producers.  Matthew Spitzer, Antitrust, Federalism, 
and the Rational Choice Political Economy: A Critique of Capture Theory, 61 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1293 (1988). 
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others,93 have advanced approaches that focus on the substantive efficiency of state and 
local regulation with a particular eye towards limiting capture in the political process.  
In contrast, Merrick Garland, now a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, has been one of the most strident proponents of a strongly 
deferential approach to the state action exception in considering the relevance of state 
regulation.94 In a leading article, he argues that there is no principled basis for 
distinguishing between municipalities and states for federal antitrust law purposes.95 Put 
simply, his view is that state and local legislation should not be assessed by the federal 
courts for either their efficiency or rent-seeking effects, or for process-based concerns, in 
antitrust cases.96 Defenders of judicial deference in antitrust federalism see judicial 
review of state and local laws for efficiency, rent-seeking or public interest goals as 
tantamount to federal courts returning to substantive due process review of state and local 
regulation, encroaching on decentralized lawmaking in the economic regulation context.  
Like advocates of deregulatory takings in public utility law attempt to reinvigorate 
Lochner97 in determining government liability for regulatory transitions,98 strong 
 
93 Cirace, supra note 34, at 515 (arguing that courts should employ an efficiency test to 
evaluate the effects of state and local legislation on claims under the Sherman Act); 
Steven Semeraro, Demystifying Antitrust State Action Doctrine, 34 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 203, 212 (2000) (arguing that, based on a “status choice” approach, courts should 
inquire “whether a government actor’s conception of the public interest is being furthered 
by an anticompetitive restraint.”).   
94 See Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the 
Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486 (1987).  
95 Id. at 502-07. 
96 Id. at 519. 
97 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
98 See J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE 
REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES 
IN THE UNITED STATES (1997).  For criticism, see Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, 
Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435 (2000);  Jim Chen, The 
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deference advocates are concerned judicial intervention in the context of evaluation of the 
state action defense necessarily will lead courts to a Lochner-type review of regulation.99 
Garland, for example, favors exempting from judicial review under the Sherman Act all 
regulatory actions by state and local governments except for delegations of the power to 
restrain the market to private parties.100 
Yet, while it has been a hundred years since Lochner was decided, and more than 
sixty years since it reigned supreme in utility law,101 no one – including those who wish 
to evaluate the efficiency of state regulations in the state action antitrust exception 
context J seriously wishes to invoke its ghost.102 Indeed, if judicial review of 
decentralized lawmaking is approached in a principled and cautious manner, a strongly 
deferential stance to state regulators is not necessary to limit the scope of judicial review.  
As Daniel Gifford has argued, federal courts have the capacity to review state and local 
legislation without directly addressing their substantive efficiency effects.103 Gifford 
suggests that courts apply the same “free market” approach to the state action antitrust 
exception that they apply under the dormant commerce clause by recognizing two 
markets.  State action antitrust evaluation would protect the internal (intra-state) market 
 
Second Coming of Smyth v. Ames, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1535 (1999); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
The Takings Clause and Improvident Regulatory Bargains, 108 YALE L.J. 801 (1999); 
Jim Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, 77 TEX. L. REV. 297 (1998). 
99 Garland, supra note 94, at 488 (making an explicit comparison to Lochner). 
100 Id. at 506. 
101 See Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) 
(abandoning substantive review of utility rates). 
102 Chen, supra note 98, at 1568. 
103 Gifford, supra note 11.   
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from trade restraints, while the dormant commerce clause extends to the external (inter-
state) market.104 
Robert Inman and Daniel Rubinfeld have perhaps made the most strident political 
process based argument in the antitrust federalism context, arguing that the state action 
antitrust defense should only apply where regulation imposes substantial spillover costs 
on out-of-state interests.105 On their view, the state action exception would not remove 
from antitrust enforcement all private monopolies sanctioned by regulation, but only 
those which are actively supervised by the state for purposes of limiting the harms that 
flow from unregulated monopoly.  As such, the active-supervision prong of state action 
antitrust doctrine is not inherently anti-commerce, but recognizes the necessity for 
regulation to correct for certain market failures where the public interest demands it.  On 
this understanding, for state action antitrust doctrine to make sense in application, 
enforcement of pro-commerce norms is necessary where the federalism-based value of 
participation conflicts with efficiency, as may occur if state regulation creates spillover 
costs for those who do not participate in the relevant state or local regulatory process.106 
In contrast to even this modest process-based view of judicial intervention, recent 
cases involving utility restructuring illustrate the problem presented by the low state 
action exemption threshold many lower courts currently utilize.  While Squire’s federal 
preemption approach embraces skepticism in approaching state and local laws, in practice 
a federal preemption approach to state action antitrust doctrine may further encourage a 
more deferential approach given the well-recognized judicial presumption against 
 
104 Id.
105 Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 27.  
106 Id. 
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preemption.  Further, the substantive cost criteria for evaluating federal preemption fail to 
adequately address state laws that do not take an affirmative regulatory approach.  
Especially in a process of restructuring or deregulation – which gives birth to the norms 
of competition – private firms face strong incentives to use the regulatory process to 
enact partial regulatory schemes for purposes of establishing immunity from the antitrust 
laws.  As states have begun to deregulate industries such as telecommunications and 
electric power, the nature of state regulation has changed.  Rather than regulating utilities 
through rate and traditional certificate-of-need proceedings, increasingly regulators are 
laying down general structural rules or approving structural, rather than pricing, tariffs.  
Most agree that, with the rise of competitive markets, antitrust law plays a more – not less 
– important role than under traditional rate regulation.107 As one Department of Justice 
lawyer has recognized in the context of antitrust enforcement in emerging competitive 
electric power markets, “If a state opens its retail market to competition, then the state 
 
107 See Merrill, supra note 65; Spulber & Yoo, supra note 65; Dibadj, supra note 11.  See 
also Ray S. Bolze et al., Antitrust Law Regulation: A New Focus for a Competitive 
Energy Industry, 21 ENERGY L.J. 79 (2000); Craig A. Glazer & M. Bryan Little, The 
Roles of Antitrust Law and Regulatory Oversight in the Restructured Electricity Industry,
12 ELECTRICITY J. 21 (May, 1999); William J. Kolasky, Network Effects: A Contrarian 
View, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 577 (1999); William Baer, FTC Perspectives on 
Competition Policy and Enforcement Initiatives in Electric Power before the Conference 
on the New Rules of the Game for Electric Power: Antitrust and Anticompetitive 
Behavior (December 4, 1997); John Burritt McArthur, Antitrust in the New 
[De]Regulated Natural Gas Industry, 18 ENERGY L.J. 1 (1997); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A
Proposed Antitrust Analysis of Telecommunications Joint Ventures, 1997 WIS. L. REV.
639; Robert Pitofsky, Remarks: Competition Policy in Communications Industries: New 
Antitrust Approaches, before the Glasser Legal Works Seminar on Competitive Policy in 
Communications Industries: New Antitrust Approaches (March 10, 1997), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitl.htm; Jade Alice Eaton, Recent United States 
Department of Justice Actions in the Electric Utility Industry 9 CONN. J. OF INT’L L. 857 
(1994). 
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action doctrine would not apply to conduct that related directly to retail competition.”108 
The reality of separating regulated from unregulated conduct for antitrust federalism 
purposes is hardly simple, however, as states frequently endorse competition in some, but 
not all, aspects of formerly regulated industries such as electric power and 
telecommunications.  
It is entirely sound for a court to extend a state action antitrust defense where a 
state or locality has a history of affirmative active state regulation, such as regular 
hearings to set rates based on cost, and continues to embrace this regulatory approach.  
However, courts also extend state action exception to antitrust enforcement in contexts 
where a state official has the jurisdiction to regulate but fails to exercise it – even where 
there is little or no history of regulatory action.  Courts are also asked to review not only 
traditional agency decisions, such as cost-of-service ratemaking, but also are asked to 
evaluate the state action implications of agency inaction, such as a failure to revoke a 
permit or a failure to enforce regulations.  In such contexts jurisdiction, or vague 
reference to a past history of regulation, is of little or no relevance to how state regulators 
approach the problem today.  Regulatory rationales – including the relationship between 
regulation and competition – can be proffered by private antitrust defendants or 
regulators on appeal, rather than at the time the agency adopts a specific regulatory 
approach.  To the extent state regulators provide any rationale at all (and in many 
instance they do not make any filings at all in antitrust litigation), the rationalization for 
failing to regulate is only provided by state officials ex post, in briefs filed in antitrust 
 
108 Joseph F. Schuler, State Action Doctrine Losing Relevance, Department of Justice 
Attorney Says, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, May 15, 1999, at 70 (quoting Milton A. 
Marquis, attorney with U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division). 
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case.  When a state regulator does file an amicus brief, courts do not address the level of 
deference they ought to afford the agency’s position.   
At one extreme, the presumption against preemption results in too much 
deference to state regulators.  At the other extreme, the federal preemption approach, 
coupled with the Chicago-school skepticism of state and local regulation, results in too 
little deference.  What both approaches share is that they treat all state and local 
regulators homogenously, without regard to institutional and other variables that 
influence the accountability of regulation at the state and local level.109 As I will argue 
below, in such circumstances state action antitrust exemption cases could learn from a 
delegation approach and Chevron step two’s focus on reasons, rather than antitrust law’s 
historical emphasis on clear statements, jurisdictional delegation, and agency actions in 
evaluating state action defenses.  Giving reasons would allow federal courts to evaluate 
whether officials have legitimate goals in mind in refusing to regulate, or whether they 
are merely opting out of antitrust enforcement to favor powerful interest groups at the 
state and local level.  In addition, such an approach could force state officials to provide 
reasons before making a decision not to regulate conduct, subjecting such reasons to 
review within a state’s regulatory system. 
 
109 Squire does emphasize that, ultimately, process matters in some way to the assessment 
of state regulation, but his test for assessing the sufficiency of process is limited to 
assessing whether the decisionmaker gives independent weight to interests of both sides 
to a transaction.  Squire, supra note 10, at 117.  Hence, a one-side ratemaking 
proceeding, whether before a legislature or a regulatory agency, would be problematic 
under his view, but he is willing to allow regulators to “enrich producers by raising 
prices, as long as consumer interests enjoy independent weight in the price-selection 
method.”  Id. This helps to sustain the preemption approach’s promise of being 
“deferential . . . but not toothless.”  Id. at 107.  But such an approach relegates process a 
mere evidentiary role in assessing whether the Sherman Act preempts state or local 
regulation. 
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II. CHEVRON, DELEGATION, AND REASONABLENESS REVIEW 
The Chevron110 case, often seen as a very pro-agency approach to the judicial 
view of regulation, has attracted the attention of administrative law scholars since it was 
decided in 1984. Chevron stands at the center of many major recent decisions by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.111 With the Mead case, decided in 2001, the Supreme Court signaled a 
clear retreat away from application of the Chevron test as the exclusive model for 
reviewing agency interpretations of law.112 However, Chevron remains the predominant 
controlling framework for most courts and commentators approaching judicial review of 
agency legal interpretations, as well as agency policy decisions made in the context of 
broad legislative delegations.113 The rationale of Chevron deference and many aspects of 
its application involving delegation concerns strongly parallel the kinds of issues courts 
 
110 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
111 Gonzalez v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 904 (2006); National Cable & Telecommunications 
Association v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 
U.S. 212 (2002); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2002); Whitman v. 
American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001); Food and Drug 
Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000); 
Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
112 In Mead, the Court suggested that Skidmore rather than Chevron will provide the 
appropriate standard for reviewing courts in approaching many agency legal 
interpretations.  533 U.S. at 230. 
113 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006) (describing 
the significance of Step Zero, “the initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework 
applies at all,” but retaining Chevron as the overarching framework); Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV.
1443, 1446 (2005) (criticizing lower courts approach to applying Mead as a kind of 
“Chevron avoidance”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, 
Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807 (2002) (observing that Chevron 
continues to apply after Mead as a meta-rule or meta-standard governing the scope of 
deference).  See also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89
GEO. L.J. 833, 833 (2001) (noting that Chevron “dramatically expanded the 
circumstances in which courts must defer to agency interpretations of statutes.”). 
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confront when they address antitrust immunities and defenses, such as the state action 
exception.  
A.  The Rise of the Chevron Framework 
Justice Stevens’ unanimous Chevron opinion articulates what has become the 
predominant judicial paradigm for review of agency interpretations of statutes and 
regulations.  In Chevron, the Supreme Court upheld the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (EPA’s) reasonable interpretation of the term “stationary sources” in the Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1977.114 The statute required “new or modified major stationary 
sources” of air pollution to comply with certain permit requirements and authorized the 
EPA to define the relevant terms by regulation.115 Initially, the EPA determined that the 
“stationary source” referred to each individual piece of equipment that emitted pollution, 
but in 1981 the agency changed its position by construing “stationary source” more 
expansively, to mean an entire plant.  As an effect of this new interpretation, firms could 
avoid some pollution permit requirements by offsetting the pollution from new 
equipment by reducing emissions from old equipment in the same plant.116 
The Chevron Court’s approach to reviewing an agency’s statutory interpretation 
distills the judicial review task into two distinct questions.  At step one of Chevron, the 
Court inquires into whether Congress “has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue.”117 If Congress has – and has done so clearly – the court “must give effect to the 
 
114 Pub. L. No. 9595, 91 Stat. 685 (1977). 
115 467 U.S. at 840 n.1 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6)).   
116 See 467 U.S. at 858-59. 
117 Id. at 842. 
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unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”118 If, however, the statute at issue is silent 
or ambiguous with respect to the specific question, a court is to move on to Chevron’s 
step two.  At step two, a court’s inquiry is limited to determining whether the agency’s 
legal interpretation “is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”119 At step two, 
Chevron endorses judicial deference to the agency’s statutory interpretation.  By leaving 
a gap in its statutory language for the agency to fill, Congress has made “an express 
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by 
regulation.”120 The gap, the Court observed, may be explicit or implicit.121 The role of a 
court in such instances is to defer to the agency’s statutory interpretation, giving the 
agency’s regulations “controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.”122 
Justice Marshall’s exhortation in Marbury v. Madison that it is “the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”123 thus takes a back seat to an 
inquiry into the reasonableness of the agency’s legal interpretation at step two of 
Chevron. In this sense, one might see Chevron as having a basis in separation of 
powers.124 Surely, however, the power to define the balance of powers in judicial review 
 
118 Id. at 843. 
119 Id.
120 Id. at 843-44. 
121 See id. at 865. 
122 Id. at 844. 
123 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
124 Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 476 (1989) (“It is surely a far more 
remarkable step than Chevron acknowledged to number among Congress’s constitutional 
prerogatives the power to compel courts to accept and enforce another entity’s view of 
legal meaning whenever the law is ambiguous.”). 
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remains within Congress’s prerogative, as is illustrated by the many statutes in which 
Congress has defined standards of review or even abolished judicial review altogether. 
Rather than separation of powers, Chevron is best explained by reference to a 
more pragmatic set of institutional concerns aimed at improving the quality of agency 
decisions and the accountability of the process that produces them.  An appreciation of 
agency expertise, the limits of the specialized knowledge of judges, and political 
accountability are at the normative core of Justice Stevens’ rationale for deference to the 
agency in Chevron. “Judges are not experts in the field,” Justice Stevens wrote in 
Chevron, and thus in interpreting statutory gaps courts should “rely upon the incumbent 
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.”125 Justice Stevens 
emphasized that judicial deference to an agency’s statutory interpretation furthers 
political accountability: 
the [EPA] Administrator’s interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation 
of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference . . . Congress 
intended to accommodate both interests, but it did not do so itself on the level of 
specificity presented by these cases.  Perhaps that body consciously desired the 
Administrator to strike the balance at this level, thinking that those with great 
expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would 
be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply did not consider the question at 
this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of 
the question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with the scheme 
devised by the agency.126 
Implicit to Justice Stevens’ accountability rationale is the recognition that agencies are 
institutionally superior to courts in their capacity for making accountable political 
 
125 467 U.S. at 865. 
126 Id.
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decisions against the backdrop of ambiguous statutory terms.127 Agency legal 
interpretations will be subject to political oversight and thus are accountable to 
Presidential politics, as well as congressional oversight.128 In addition, as Professor Peter 
Strauss has argued, for reasons of judicial economy Chevron promotes uniformity in 
regulatory policy. Because the Supreme Court has limited resources to resolve conflicting 
statutory interpretations by lower courts, judicial acceptance of agency legal 
interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms will promote uniformity in interpretation, 
providing regulated entities and other branches of government some degree of certainty 
in assessing the meaning of ambiguous statutory terms.129 Thus, while some 
commentators see separation of powers130 or Congressional intent to delegate lawmaking 
authority as the primary rationale for Chevron deference,131 political accountability and 
 
127 See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking 
in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83 (1994). 
128 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency 
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 486 
(1990) (explaining that Chevron is justified by the agency's superior political 
accountability).  At the extreme, this view sees Chevron as working pure unitary 
executive principles.   
129 See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the 
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1093 (1987). 
130 See, e.g., Farina, supra note 124, at  476 (“It is surely a far more remarkable step than 
Chevron acknowledged to number among Congress’s constitutional prerogatives the 
power to compel courts to accept and enforce another entity’s view of legal meaning 
whenever the law is ambiguous.”).  See also Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot:  
Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. 187, 189-90, 
202-03 (1992) (using constitutional concerns of institutional roles of Congress to 
distinguish deference analysis for interpretive rules and legislative rules); Randolph J. 
May, Tug of Democracy:  Justices Pull for America’s Separation of Powers, LEGAL 
TIMES, July 9, 2001, at 51 (applauding Mead on the ground that its limits on Chevron are 
consistent with constitutional principles). 
131 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 114 (arguing that Chevron doctrine should be 
defined with respect to Congress’s intent to delegate lawmaking authority to an agency).   
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institutional concerns are also widely accepted as justifications for the doctrine.132 
Although it has been observed that the direct impact of Chevron on the doctrinal 
approach of lower courts is sometimes overstated,133 studies suggest that the decision did 
affect the reversal and remand rates for judicial appeals of agency decisions in lower 
courts.134 
B. Extending Chevron Review to State Economic Regulation 
Apart from a very active current debate regarding the scope of Chevron 
deference, courts have struggled with two issues in applying Chevron to review of agency 
regulation.  The purpose of this Article is not to catalog the entire range of problems that 
courts have confronted,135 but to highlight the issues that are most relevant in expanding 
Chevron’s delegation structure to antitrust immunities and defenses.  First, at step one of 
the Chevron inquiry courts have struggled with the role of non-textual information 
regarding statutory meaning.  Although there is substantial disagreement regarding what 
sources courts should draw on in discerning statutory meaning, if taken seriously by 
 
132 See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001
S.CT. REV. 201, 223 (stating, “The only workable approach is the approach that Chevron 
took in the beginning:  to fill in legislative silence about judicial review by making policy 
choices based on institutional attributes, with Congress then free to overrule these 
conclusions.”). 
133 See Merrill, supra note 17 (Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent). 
134 Professors Peter Schuck and E. Donald Elliott observe that affirmance rates increased 
by almost 15% after Chevron, and both remands and reversals declined by roughly 40%.  
See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of 
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1058.  The authors concluded, “On the 
evidence of this study, the Supreme Court is sometimes able to affect the shape of the 
court-agency relationship through the kinds of relatively broad, open-textured rule 
adopted in Chevron.” Id. at 1059.  Another study finds that the D.C. Circuit’s deference 
to EPA interpretations increased after Chevron. See Aaron P. Avila, Applications of the 
Chevron Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 8 N.Y.U. ENVT’L L. J. 398 (2000). 
135 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 114, at 848-52 (cataloging a range of “unresolved 
questions” with Chevron’s application). 
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courts step one of Chevron creates incentives for clear legistative statements, thus 
enhancing the transparency of the legislative process.  Second, while courts have 
struggled with the appropriate approach to Chevron step two, recent judicial and 
scholarly focus on the delegation issues presented at Chevron step two have a particular 
traction in the context of assessing state and local regulation. 
1. Step One’s Limits as a Clear Statement Rule 
At step one of the Chevron inquiry, a court focuses primarily on what the statute 
means.  Discerning meaning remains a controversial judicial task, but if a court can 
resolve the issue of judicial meaning, it is the judiciary prerogative to determine whether 
an agency’s regulatory approach violates the statute.  In cases such as FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the FDA lacked authority to 
regulate cigarettes as nicotine delivery “devices” subject to FDA jurisdiction under the 
Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, this is precisely the role that a court plays.136 The court’s 
task at step one is to determine statutory meaning J a task judges have the experience and 
institutional competence to perform without drawing on anyone else’s expertise.  
One popular approach to conceptualizing Chevron’s step one inquiry focuses on 
the background incentives favoring legislative delegation.  The basic approach is to 
understand step one as creating incentives for legislative clarity and comprehensiveness 
and against broad delegations.  On this view, if Congress wishes for courts to restrain 
agencies, it should use clear and unambiguous language in the legislation it passes.  
 
136 Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 
(2000).  Einer Elhauge defends this result by arguing that the Court was following current 
enactable congressional preferences, as is appropriate where the Court reviews agency 
interpretations of ambiguous provisions.  Einer Elhauge, Preference Estimating Statutory 
Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2148-54 (2002). 
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Justice Scalia, for example, has praised Chevron for creating an incentive for Congress to 
use clear language in statutes:  “Congress now knows that the ambiguities it creates . . . 
will be resolved, within the bounds of permissible interpretation, not by the courts, but by 
a particular agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be known.”137 
Put another way, judicial deference to an agency – triggered by the step one 
inquiry of whether Congress failed to use clear language to limit agency policy choices – 
serves as a “default rule” which, on a case-by-case basis, Congress can change.138 Where 
Congress is sloppy, as it frequently is in drafting statutes, Congress and interest groups 
face the potential “penalty” of judicial deference – generally reaffirming the agency’s 
view J at step two.  Einer Elhauge, for example, has argued that Chevron doctrine 
allocates authority between courts and agencies in a way that is designed to ensure that 
the resolution of statutory ambiguity will best match current (majoritarian) government 
preferences.139 In this sense, step one of Chevron can operate as a type of clear statement 
rule, designed to elicit statutory clarity from Congress where there is a majoritarian 
preference supporting clarity.  A desirable byproduct of such approach is to channel 
interest group lobbying efforts to focus on Congress, not agencies or courts, making it 
more likely that legislative decisions better reflect majoritarian preferences. 
While clear statements at Chevron’s step one have an appealing democracy-
forcing function, it approached too aggressively they invite judicial mischief and, by 
 
137 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 511, 517. 
138 See id., at 517 (describing Chevron as a “background rule of law against which 
Congress can legislate.”); Merrill, supra note 17, at 978 (Judicial Deference to Executive 
Precedent) (referring to Chevron as a “default rule” which “Congress can change”). 
139 Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
2163 (2002) (arguing for preference-eliciting default rules in statutory interpretation).   
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hamstringing agencies on programmatic details in contexts on the specific or narrow 
types of issues for which congressional revision is unlikely, may undermine sound 
regulatory policy.  Indeed on one understanding of the judicial role at Chevron’s step one, 
a courts primary emphasis is on whether clear and unambiguous language prohibits or 
precludes a regulatory from exercising discretion in a certain a way; at the extreme, such 
an approach invites invites aggressive judicial attribution of clear statutory meaning as a 
way of limiting agency discretion and avoiding subjecting an interpretation to Chevron 
step two deference at all.140 In contrast to this oft-criticized approach, the predominant 
approach of courts in reviewing an agency’s interpretation at Chevron’s step one focuses 
on whether a statutory gap or ambiguity exists, leaving questions about how an agency 
exercises discretion for resolution at Chevron’s step two.141 
2. Step Two as a Reason-Giving Requirement 
Step two of Chevron assumes that the statute itself does not answer the question 
of whether an agency’s action is valid.  While many courts are extremely deferential in 
 
140 For a notable Supreme Court case illustrating this activist approach to applying 
Chevron step one, see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).  There, the 
majority’s step one analysis (applied to reverse the INS) was so searching that it 
prompted Justice Scalia to argue that it “implies that courts may substitute their 
interpretation of a statute for that of an agency whenever . . . they are able to reach a 
conclusion as to the proper interpretation of the statute.” Id. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring 
in the judgment). Justice Scalia protested that the Court's "approach would make 
deference a doctrine of desperation, authorizing courts to defer only if they would 
otherwise be unable to construe the enactment at issue. This is not an interpretation but an 
evisceration of Chevron.”  Id. 
141 Chevron itself embraced such an approach.  467 U.S. at 843-44 (“If Congress has 
explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the 
agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation . . . . Sometimes the 
legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit.  
In such a case, the court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision 
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of the agency.”).  See also 
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 114 (adopting a delegation approach to Chevron step one, 
in which courts focus on whether a gap or ambiguity exists). 
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reviewing agency action at step two, most commentators today see Chevron’s step two as 
co-existing with a type of reasonableness review of agency action as a way of managing 
the discretion exercised by the agency in the context of a legislative delegation.   For 
example, in endorsing “hard look” review, the Supreme Court has stated that a rule 
Would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which 
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important 
aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to 
the decision before it, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a 
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.142 
The notice and comment process binds the agency legally to produce explanatory 
material in the form of a statement of general basis and purpose,143 and the rigors of hard 
look review work to promote deliberation and accountability,144 and protect against 
arbitrariness,145 in this process.  Several recent commentators emphasize such an 
approach to arbitrary and capricious review addresses delegation-type concerns.146 It has 
also been observed that hard look review serves a “signaling” function by allowing courts 
to overcome their comparative informational disadvantage in assessing complex technical 
and policy issues vis-à-vis other branches to the extent a “court can reason that the expert 
government decisionmaker’s willingness to provide an explanation signals that the 
government believes the benefits of the proposed policy are high.”147 
142 Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983). 
143 See 5 U.S.C. §553(c). 
144 See Seidenfeld, supra note 127. 
145 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461 (2002). 
146 See id.; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text (citing Bressman, Stack, 
Criddle). 
147 Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of ‘Hard Look’ Review, 58
ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 755 (2006). 
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Indeed, evidence suggests that courts find attractive the kind of heightened review 
reflected in a delegation approach to step two.  While it has been observed that in practice 
step two Chevron review is so lenient that it is almost meaningless,148 lower courts take 
hard look review more seriously.149 The first fifteen years following Chevron were 
characterized by the U.S. Supreme Court’s failure to reverse an agency at step two of 
Chevron, but in at least two recent cases the Court has adopted a more rigorous approach 
to step two, reversing and remanding agency action where regulators failed to provide 
adequate reasons in making their decisions.150 If public choice concerns justify such 
review in the context of federal agencies,151 such concerns are even more salient in the 
context of state and local economic regulation.  Moreover, two of the main rationales for 
strong Chevron deference at the federal level are inapposite to the state and local 
government context:  the national uniformity interest in strong Chevron deference is 
simply not applicable;152 and the unitary executive153 is foreign to most state and local 
 
148 Seidenfeld, supra note 127, at 84. See also Ronald Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron:
Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1261 (1997) (noting that as of 1997 
the Supreme Court has never struck down an agency interpretation by relying squarely on 
Chevron’s step two).    
149 See Levin, supra note 148. 
150 In AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999), the Supreme Court 
arguably relied on Chevron’s step two to reverse the agency’s decision.  Also, in 
American Trucking, the Court relied on step two in reversing and remanding the EPA’s 
rule.  Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).  
151 See Bressman, supra note 18 (citing public choice concerns). 
152 Peter Strauss has advanced Chevron deference as a way of promoting uniformity in 
agency interpretations and policy approaches.  See Strauss, supra note 129.  Deference to 
a state or local regulator may further uniformity, but only within the state or local 
jurisdiction at issue and not at the national level. 
153 See supra note 17 (citing Paulsen, Merrill). 
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governments, where the more predominant executive governance model is governance by 
plural executive or by commission rather than a single executive branch official.154 
Beyond hard look review, the kinds of delegation issues courts routinely address 
at Chevron step two have four additional implications for economic regulation.  First, 
under Chevron, courts are frequently asked to address how deference relates to the 
presumption against preemption as an interpretive canon.  While the problem presented 
by the state action antitrust exemption may raise federalism concerns, in the antitrust 
context the deference issue demands a different analysis, given that vertical rather than 
horizontal deference is at issue.  Second, private delegations have historically called for 
heightened judicial review in administrative law, in large part as a constitutional 
avoidance mechanism.  Third, as has long been recognized, courts frown on agencies 
providing reasons for their decisions after the fact, as occurs when an agency provides a 
post hoc rationale for its position in a brief filed in a judicial proceeding.  Fourth, the hard 
look doctrine can not only extend to affirmative agency decisions to regulate, but can and 
should also be used to attack agency failures to act.  All of these questions relate to the 
kinds of delegation issues that courts are called to address in the context of applying the 
antitrust state action exception. 
To begin, courts are frequently called on to address how Chevron relates to 
federalism-oriented concerns, such as a respect for decentralized decisionmaking and 
 
154 For discussion of divergence between governors under state constitutions and the U.S. 
President, see William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency: Governors, State Attorneys 
General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446 (2006) 
(contrasting the federal unitary executive with the model of the state executive, which is 
typically plural); Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure 
and Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 559 (2001) (observing that “in most 
states the ability of a governor to oversee executive branch policymaking is weak in 
comparison to the U.S. President.”). 
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state sovereignty.  The approach of those who embrace a preemption-based 
understanding of the state action exception, such as Squire, would see preemption of state 
regulation of antitrust cases – i.e., a judicial finding of no state action exception J as 
applying only where a court makes an affirmative finding that the regulatory purposes of 
a state approach conflict with the purposes of the Sherman Act.155 However, if the state 
action antitrust defense is cast entirely as a preemption issue, a background presumption 
against preemption, requiring an affirmative finding by courts to overcome the mere fact 
of state and local regulation, also invites courts to define the range of regulatory actions 
leading to antitrust exemptions too broadly.  At one extreme, given the ambiguous 
approach of Congress in the Sherman Act, no state or local law at all would be 
preempted.  At the other extreme, Congress could not have intended to allowed passage 
of the Sherman Act to invalidate a broad range of state and local regulation at the time, 
including grain regulation, sewage regulation, and trolley franchises.  For this reason, on 
its own terms a preemption approach to the state action exception provides a troubling 
basis for courts to use in applying state action doctrine. 
As Nina Mendelson has emphasized, “the source of the tension between Chevron 
and the presumption against preemption is that Congress has failed to define explicitly 
whether it believes a statute preempts state law or whether it wishes an administrative 
agency to decide that question.”156 In the context of horizontal deference issues, 
deference and the presumption against preemption pull judicial scrutiny in opposite 
directions.  Where Congress makes ambiguous delegations, Mendelson suggests that 
courts need to exercise their own independent judgement to resolve state law preemption 
 
155 Squire, supra note 10. 
156 Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737 (2004). 
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questions rather than defer to federal agencies at step two of Chevron.157 In particular, 
raising some of the concerns that inform the delegation-oriented account of Chevron, she 
focuses on how this can further institutional competence and political accountability 
goals, as well as how this promotes agency expertise, protects against self-interest, and 
minimizes the prospect of arbitrary decisionmaking.158 Of course, the state action 
exception addresses judicial deference to state – not federal – regulation.  Here, the 
presumption against preemption and deference do pull courts in opposite directions but 
point in the precisely same direction – supporting deference to state regulators.  In such a 
context, blind judicial adherence to a presumption against preemption would perversely 
result in not less but more deference to regulators in the state action exception context.  In 
many respects, the deference problem presented to courts in the state action exception 
context is fundamentally different from that presented in other federalism contexts 
involving Chevron. Independent of any congressional decision to delegate, state and 
local governments have always had and retain significant regulatory powers if they 
choose to exercise them J as the judicially-created category of state action doctrine 
recognizes.  Thus, in the context of the state action exception, the deference problem 
presented to courts is fundamentally different from that presented in other federalism 
contexts involving Chevron. That is not to say the lessons of Chevron are irrelevant, but 
there is good reason to think that the same approach to issues like federalism simply is 
not justified where deference to state, rather than federal, regulators is at issue.  As with 
other Chevron questions, any institutional analysis of the deference problem presented by 
state action exception must focus on the competence of various actors and incentives 
 
157 Id. at 800. 
158 Id. 
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produced in the state lawmaking process.  Given the well-accepted Madisonian account 
of interest group behavior in state and local politics, increased caution in deferring is in 
order in this context.  If, as Mendelsohn argues, independent judicial inquiry is necessary 
to protect accountability in the context of a federal agency making a decision to preempt 
state regulation, an even greater level of judicial scrutiny will be necessary to protect 
accountability where the preemption decision hinges on the policy choice of a state or 
local regulator.  
Nor are courts any more inclined to defer to federal delegations to state agencies.  
The D.C. Circuit has recognized this basic principle, and the limits of Chevron deference, 
in the context of telecommunications regulation.  In response to a series of reversals on 
its rules intended to foster a competitive market in local telecommunications,159 the 
Federal Communications Commission adopted a provisional nationwide rule subject to 
the possibility of local exceptions.  The rules relegated to state public utility commissions 
the power to determine when local exceptions to access were warranted, even though 
Congress had specifically directed the FCC to itself consider whether the lack of access 
would impair the ability of an entrant to provide service.  On review, the D.C. Circuit 
reversed the FCC’s “subdelegation” of determination of an “impairment” to a state 
agency.160 While the court recognized it entirely appropriate for the FCC to delegate to a 
subordinate within the agency, it limited subdelegation to outside parties, including state 
or local regulators, for fear that “lines of accountability may blur, undermining an 
 
159 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utitilies Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); United States Telecom Assn. 
v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
160 United States Telecom. Ass’n. v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
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important democratic check on government decision-making.”161 The court emphasized 
that such subdelegation “aggravates the risk of policy drift inherent in any principal-agent 
relationship.”162 
Second, courts applying Chevron review delegations to private entities with an 
especially jaundiced eye.  The general movement away from traditional means of 
regulation and towards deregulation and privatization has generated much praise for the 
challenge it presents to many negative aspects of the traditional regulatory state.163 
Administrative law has long recognized, however, that private delegations also present a 
unique set of problems – bordering, at some level, on the unconstitutional.164 As Paul 
Verkuil has recent chronicled, privatization can be pursued without thwarting public 
values if certain inherent democratic functions are preserved by democratically 
accountable public officials.165 More than two decades ago, Cass Sunstein highlighted 
these concerns in the context of step two of the Chevron framework by calling for more 
 
161 Id. at 565-66. 
162 Id. at 566.  The D.C. Circuit distinguished, and left open the permissibility of, 
subdelegations for “(1) establishing a reasonable condition for granting federal approval; 
(2) fact gathering; and (3) advice giving.”  Id. 
163 See Orley Lobel, The Renew Deal:  The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2005) (describing a 
“paradigm shift” away from top-down, command and control approach to regulation and 
towards a more reflexive approach to governance, placing private stakeholders at the 
driver’s wheel). 
164 The outer limit is best summarized in Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 322 (1936) 
(invalidating a delegation to a district board elected by coal operators and unions that 
would set wages binding upon all coal producers and noting “[t]his [was] legislative 
delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it [was] not even delegation to an official or an 
official body, presumptively disinterested.”).  See also Louis L. Jaffe, Lawmaking by 
Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 248 (1937) (expressing concerns with private 
delegations but suggesting that Carter Coal’s emphasis on the nondelegation doctrine 
might be replaced by a focus on due process issues). 
165 Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privitization of Government Functions,
84 N.C. L. REV. 397 (2006). 
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heightened reasonableness review of deregulatory policies.166 As the issue of private 
delegations highlights, where these policies are executed entirely by private entities, and 
involve little or no judgment on the part of regulators – as may be the case where a 
legislature has delegated the setting of rates to an industry167 J the basis for an elevated 
standard of review is strong, if nothing else as a type of constitutional avoidance device.  
As Kenneth Bamberger has recently observed, there are significant accountability 
benefits to courts extending basic administrative law principles to private delegations.168 
Third, it is a well recognized tenet of administrative law that if an agency has 
failed to provide reasons or has provided inadequate reasons a court may not repair the 
deficiency by providing post hoc rationalizations.  As the Supreme Court stated in SEC v. 
Chenery Corp.,
[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment that an 
administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of 
such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.  If those grounds are 
inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action 
by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis.169 
Courts may accept post hoc explanations from agencies that “merely illuminate reasons 
obscured but implicit in the administrative record.”170 However, if the subsequent 
explanation provides an “entirely new theory” to support the agency’s decision and does 
 
166 Cass Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177
(advocating for a “hard look” approach to judicial review in reviewing deregulatory 
policies).  But see Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 505 (1985) (criticizing “hard look” review of agency decision making, especially in 
the deregulation context). 
167 As was the case in Ticor. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. 
168 Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, 
and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377 (2006). 
169 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). 
170 Consumer Federal of America v. U.S. Department of HHS, 83 F.3d 1497, 1507 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996). 
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not “simply provide additional background information about the agency’s basic 
rationale,” it will be rejected.171 Courts have applied this principle to reject agency 
rationalizations provided in briefs but not provided by the agency itself in making the 
initial decision subject to appeal.172 Even government litigation positions that are 
advanced by the agency itself may be afforded less weight if they are only provided post 
hoc, on the grounds that Congress did not delegate to executive agencies the authority to 
justify agency decisions after the fact.173 This principle is quite foundational to 
administrative law, frequently serving as a basis for agency reversal and giving agency 
officials “strong incentives to attend to the justifications they provide for their actions.”174 
To the extent that this principle extends to the state action exception, as I argue it should 
below, courts should evaluate reasons after the fact by state regulators or reasons 
proffered by private litigants with skepticism and afford them no deference; agency 
positions presented ex post should be afforded less deference than agency positions taken 
concurrent with or prior to a decision. 
Finally, the hard look doctrine, which generally would apply at Chevron’s step 
two, not only addresses affirmative decisions by regulators but also provides an important 
rationale for extending judicial review to agency inaction – such as the failure to adopt a 
 
171 Id.
172 In Christensen v. Harris County, for example, the Supreme Court refused to extend 
Chevron deference to an amicus brief filed by the United States supporting the 
interpretation at issue.  529 U.S. 576, 582, 587 (2000).  See also Merrill & Hickman, 
supra note 114, at 901 (noting that the Court’s rationale for Chevron “clearly precludes 
giving Chevron deference” to interpretations that are “post hoc rationalizations provided 
by agency counsel such as agency briefs”). 
173 See Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. ___ 
(forthcoming 2007) (arguing that the Chenery principle – focusing on what the agency 
has articulated as a grounds for its actions, not only on what is permissible or rational – is 
based on constitutional nondelegation doctrine). 
174 Id., at __. 
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rule, to enforce a regulation, to issue a permit, or to regulate a firm’s conduct J as well as 
affirmative agency regulatory decisions.  As Lisa Bressman has argued, since an agency 
is susceptible to corrosive influences when it fails to act, courts can play a useful role in 
policing agency inaction.175 Specifically, the failure to enforce pre-articulated regulatory 
goals may be reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious doctrine.  As Bressman states: 
[A]dministrative nonenforcement decisions should be subject to the familiar 
requirement that agencies articulate reasons supporting their affirmative 
regulatory decisions.  In addition, administrative nonenforcement decisions 
should be subject to the important requirement that agencies promulgate and 
follow standards guiding their affirmative regulatory authority.  Only by 
subjecting agency inaction to these principles will courts help agencies resist the 
influences that produce arbitrary administrative decisionmaking regardless of how 
those influences are manifested.176 
Just as an agency must provide reasons for taking affirmative regulatory action, where 
any agency fails to regulate its inaction should be subject to a reasons-giving requirement 
and scrutinized by courts at step two of Chevron.177 Regulatory inaction can also be 
understood on delegation terms – an otherwise valid legislative delegation of authority is 
more likely to raise private delegation concerns where an agency has authority to regulate 
but does nothing,178 so the justification for heightened judicial scrutiny in this context is 
strong.  Such a principle can play an important role in the state action antitrust exception 
 
175 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness 
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1757 (2004). 
176 Id. at 1661. 
177 Bressman discusses two nonjusticiability doctrines in administrative law that can pose 
a barrier to such review:   nonreviewability doctrine and standing doctrine.  As she 
suggests, neither is an insurmountable barrier to judicial review of agency inaction.  Id at 
1664-75. 
178 On heightened judicial review as an avoidance mechanism for addressing the 
constitutionality of private delegations, see supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text. 
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context, where private firms frequently assert a state action defense against the backdrop 
of inaction by regulators at the state or local level.    
 
III. THE LIMITS OF CLEAR STATEMENTS AS THE BASIS FOR 
APPROVING ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT OR SUPPORTING 
DELEGATIONS 
As Frank Easterbook has suggested, legal presumptions can play an important 
role in antitrust law, particularly where these serve as a type of gate-keeping filter for 
judicial consideration of antitrust claims.179 If the state action exception doctrine is 
approached as providing default rules to guide judicial intervention, such presumptions 
could set positive background incentives in the bargaining process of state law making. 
The first step of the Midcal test – the clear articulation requirement – holds some promise 
in this regard.  In approaching the clear-articulation requirement of Midcal, courts might 
take a lesson from Chevron’s analysis, especially its call for modesty in attributing 
statutory meaning and its emphasis on clarity as a mechanism for promoting more 
democratic decisionmaking.  The state action antitrust exemption promotes federalism 
values – values we endorse because they enhance democratic legitimacy; properly 
approached, clear statements rules skew decisionmaking towards the political process and 
away from judicial resolution.180 By requiring such statements as a predicate to 
extending an antitrust state action defense, courts could make it more likely that a 
legislature is explicit about a decision to approve allegedly anticompetitive conduct or to 
delegate (and on what terms) such approval to a regulatory agency. 
 
179 Easterbrook, supra note 26 (The Limits of Antitrust). 
180 William N. Eskridge , Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:  Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992). 
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If a state or local legislative body endorses a clear ban on competition, leaving no 
role for agency regulators (or private firms) in implementing the ban, there is little for a 
federal court to resolve by evaluating the legitimacy of the ban; this is precisely the sort 
of state determination that the Sherman Act intended to leave in place, so long as it is 
made in a legitimate and transparent manner.181 In such an instance, the legislature has 
explicitly approved the allegedly anticompetitive conduct ex ante by stating its policy of 
displacing competition.  Assuming such a policy is explicit, clear and self-executing, a 
court should use a clear statement approach to make a finding that the state policy gives 
rise to a state action exception.     
In most instances, however, a legislature will not itself have expressed a clear and 
comprehensive view, but will have delegated some discretion in its implementation to a 
regulatory agency.  Assuming that such a delegation is clear in its purpose to displace 
competition, the legislature has met the minimum requirements for clarity, although there 
still may be important issues to assess regarding regulatory oversight.  However, it is far 
more worrisome if a legislature is ambiguous about its specific purpose in delegating to 
an agency and a court purports to find clarity for purposes of satisfying Midcal’s first 
step.  As has been observed, Chevron’s step one invites judges to engage in the same 
interpretive mischief.182 In such cases, rather than overemphasizing clarity, courts need 
to carefully address the scope of the delegation and the extent to which, if at all, the 
 
181 By contrast, if a state or local legislative body adopts a clear statement by expressly 
articulating policy to regulate in restraint of trade, as they do in endorsing a monopoly 
franchise that is rate regulated by an agency, the courts may have a very different role to 
play.  Here the clear statement is a delegation, and a court still has to evaluate how that 
delegation is exercised under step two of the Midcal test.  See infra Part IV. 
182 See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing Cardoza-Fonseca approach to 
Chevron step one).   
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legislature has provided guidance for the regulatory agency – an exercise that can aid the 
judicial inquiry into active supervision.  Just as most courts applying Chevron do not
limit their analysis at step one to whether a statute merely delegates the issue to an 
agency, aggressively reversing the agency where it does not and blindly deferring to the 
agency in any instance in which it does,183 the clear articulation requirement of Midcal 
should not merely emphasize whether the legislature itself has articulated a general policy 
of displacing competition with clarity.  Given that many state regulatory programs 
delegate discretion, sometimes with a clear purpose but only a general one, it is important 
for courts to define what questions remain for agency regulators to make under the statute 
– issues that will need to be assessed at step two of the Midcal test when the agency 
supervision role is examined.   
Where the state or local legislative intent regarding the relationship between a 
state law and the goals of the Sherman Act is at all ambiguous, or is only general in 
nature, courts should refuse to attribute clear articulation of a specific legislative purpose 
unless there is evidence that this is what a current majority in the state would endorse.  
How the legislature articulates a regulatory program should play an important role in 
deciding whether courts review the action.  “The clear articulation requirement serves an 
important purpose,” C. Douglas Floyd writes, “by ensuring that departures from the 
presumptive federal competitive norm are authorized only as the result of a carefully 
 
183 As Cass Sunstein has stated:  “An ambiguity is simply not a delegation of law-
interpreting power.  Chevron confuses the two.”  Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes 
in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L .REV. 405, 445 (1989).  A legislature can delegate 
clearly delegate, or can delegate ambiguously.   
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considered, deliberately adopted, and visible state policy.”184 As William Page has 
argued in some of the leading articles on state action immunity, such a clear statement 
heightens the visibility of legislation, encouraging participants in the political process to 
acquire information about and to debate policies.185 Absent such a statement, private 
conduct that is consistent with or authorized by broad delegations to municipal 
governments or regulatory agencies would be subject to review under the Sherman Act.  
The key variable in such an analysis should not be the creation of a majoritarian fiction, 
based on a selective reconstruction of what a past legislature would have thought.  
Instead, where there is ambiguity, courts should focus on clear evidence of what a current 
majority would think, since the focus is on encouraging more legitimate democratic 
processes today at the state and local level.186 
Such an approach is hardly foreign to local government law and its operation.  
Although largely superseded by modern “home rule” approaches to local government, 
Dillon’s rule served the same overall goal of providing a higher level of supervision for 
 
184 C. Douglas Floyd, Plain Ambiguities in the Clear Articulation Requirement for State 
Action Antitrust Immunity, 41 B.C. L. REV. 1059, 1136 (2000).   Writing before Ticor,
Floyd argued that clear articulation alone should suffice for purposes of extending state 
action immunity to state-wide sovereign bodies, including both legislatures and agencies.  
Based on a Chevron-based analysis of the problem, informed by the political science of 
interest group decisionmaking, I reject this position below, infra Parts III and IV, except 
for in the extreme cases in which nothing at all is left to others in implementing a state 
regulatory approach. 
185 William H. Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in 
the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618; William H. Page, Antitrust, 
Federalism and the Regulatory Process, 61 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1099 (1981).  
186 See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 136, at 2148-54 (defending step one reversal of an 
agency where the agency’s position does not represent “any enactable political 
preference”); Note, “How Clear is Clear” in Chevron’s Step One, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1987, 1706 (2005) (describing step one process of predicting current congressional 
majority). 
ANTITRUST PROCESS AND VERTICAL DEFERENCE 
- 63 -
municipal lawmaking.187 This canon of statutory interpretation applied in many states to 
invalidate broad state delegations to municipalities, although most states have moved 
away from this with the growth of “home rule.”  The effect of the clear-articulation 
requirement, however, is not merely to create a federally-enforced version of Dillon’s 
rule.  Dillon’s rule invalidated delegations to municipalities absent express consideration 
by the state legislature.188 In contrast to Dillon’s rule, which automatically validated a 
clear delegation, the clear-articulation requirement of Midcal would subject private 
conduct within the scope of the delegation to scrutiny under the Sherman Act.   
Yet, traditional clear statement rules have their limits as they assume that a 
legislature itself speaks with a single purpose and voice.  As Kenneth Shepsle and many 
others before and after him have put it, a legislature is a “they,” not an “it.”189 A clear 
statement rule is a hermeneutic effort to get at legislative intent – to pay fidelity to past 
preferences, which are judicially constructed as a fiction J but a legislature having made 
a delegation will rarely have a clear specific intent on an issue of complex economic 
regulation.  Courts can readily abuse clear statement rules to the extent judges use 
judicially-implied clear statements as a backdoor way to impose a constitutional design, 
allowing “judicial modesty to cloak judicial activism.”190 Moreover, a clear statement 
rule assumes that the major problem is the legislature, not the interest groups which 
interact with lawmaking bodies.   
 
187 See Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon's Rule, or, Can Public Choice 
Theory Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 960-61 (1991). 
188 See Merriam v. Moody’s  Executors, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868).  
189 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a ‘They,’ Not an ‘It’:  Legislative Intent as an 
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. OF LAW & ECON. 239 (1992). 
190 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 180, at 646. 
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By contrast, a different type of interpretive canon – a preference-eliciting default 
rule – provides a better way of conceptualizing the clear-articulation requirement in state 
action immunity.  These parallels calls for a “penalty default rule” in judicial 
interpretation of certain types of statutes:  Where a court interpreting a statute is unsure of 
legislative intent, the court adopts the interpretation of the statute that is most unfavorable 
to the interest group which is most likely to persuade the legislative body to reverse the 
judicial interpretation.191 Much as penalty default rules in contract law are designed to 
elicit better information in future contracting,192 such a preference-eliciting approach 
encourages a different type of private behavior in future lawmaking processes.  In his 
work on statutory interpretation, Elhauge envisions a preference-eliciting approach as 
influencing private behavior to procure more explicit legislative action in the future, 
which will increase the accountability of the political process.193 He observes that such 
an approach is especially suitable to statutes that involve exceptions favored by powerful 
interest groups, such as tax and antitrust legislation.194 
In contexts where the legislature is itself clear and specific regarding allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct, the clear articulation requirement in state action antitrust 
exception can serve precisely this purpose.  However, understood as a preference-
eliciting default rule, a clear-articulation requirement should not to give rise to automatic 
state action immunity where a legislature is ambiguous and arguably could foresee some 
regulatory activity, as has occurred in a variety of past cases.  It has been observed that 
 
191 Elhauge, supra note 139 (Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules).   
192 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal 
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992). 
193 Elhauge, supra note 139 (Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules). 
194 Id. at 2207. 
ANTITRUST PROCESS AND VERTICAL DEFERENCE 
- 65 -
courts repeatedly place an emphasis on foreseeability as the basis for inferring clarity in a 
legislature’s purpose to displace the Sherman Act: courts seems to equate a grant of 
authority, or a delegation to an agency, with a clear purpose to displace competition 
under the Sherman Act.195 A penalty-default clear statement rule would afford ambiguity 
a purpose that the interest groups most likely to reverse the interpretation (i.e., those with 
monopoly power in an industry) would disfavor – here, antitrust enforcement.  Interest 
groups may be successful in persuading state and local lawmakers to adopt an antitrust 
exemption for industries, but legislatures should be expected to use clear and 
unmistakable language in supplanting antitrust laws with regulation and especially in 
making delegations to implement such regulation to local governments or regulatory 
agencies.  Beyond clear and unmistakable statutory terms, however, courts must 
recognize where discretion, even constrained discretion, remains for state regulators.196 
Indeed, the risks of judicial overreaching at Midcal’s step one are far more significant 
than overreaching at Chevron’s step one, since they involve federal judicial interpretation 
of state and local legislation.   
 
195 See FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 4, at 2 (condemning expansive 
interpretation of “clear articulation” by many federal courts). 
196 Hence, by arguing for a modest penalty default rule approach, I am not endorsing a 
hypertextualist approach to discerning meaning, in which federal courts rely almost 
exclusively on dictionaries, rules of grammar, and canons of construction to determine 
when a state legislature has clearly articulated a policy of displacing competition.  For a 
discussion of this analogy in the Chevron context, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme 
Court’s New Hypertextualism:  An Incoherence to Cacophony and the Incoherence in the 
Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1995).  Instead, I am urging federal courts 
to draw on the full range of tools available to them to discern meaning, but to exercise 
caution against implying clarity where none exists by construing ambiguous statutes 
against those who stand to immediately benefit from such clarity and who are in a 
position to lobby for clarity.  In the state action exception context, that will typically be 
the firms that claim that federal antitrust laws do not apply to them. 
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This has two implications.  First, courts should be reluctant to read detail in state 
and local statutes as a way of constraining discretion, although such detail can play an 
important role in identifying whether a program of regulatory supervision has 
standards.197 Second, any clear statement at Midcal’s step one should limits its focus on 
the extent to which a legislative delegation is explicit in its purposes.  To the extent that 
courts reduce the state action antitrust defense to foreseeability under Hallie, based on 
implied legislative intent,198 application of the state action defense would benefit the 
interest groups most likely to lobby for ambiguous delegations.  By encouraging firms to 
lobby for antitrust exclusion in state legislation, and leaving courts to clean up ambiguity 
through their aggressive attribution of clarity, state action immunity can have harmful 
forum selection effects.  For example, a state restructuring plan that envisions a scheme 
of competitive restructuring as displacing antitrust enforcement could eviscerate the 
competitive norms of the antitrust laws, regardless of how such a scheme actually 
organizes the industry and monitors firm behavior.  Antitrust federalism allows positive 
regulation by decentralized governmental bodies, but it does not authorize raw state 
repeal of federal antitrust law through ambiguous delegations or even through plain 
language overrides of the Sherman Act that depend on decisions of regulators.199 Thus, 
to the extent the preference-eliciting default rule interpretation of state action immunity 
eviscerates the active scrutiny requirement, it concedes too much.  This result is not 
 
197 As I suggest below, such emphasis on detail would more appropriately occur in 
evaluating active supervision.  See infra Part IV. 
198 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. 
199 William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, State Regulation in the Shadow of Antitrust: FTC 
v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 3 SUPREME COURT ECON. REV. 189 (1993). 
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required by judicial deference or antitrust federalism, and may prove harmful to social 
welfare. 
While the parallel to Chevron’s step one provides a useful interpretation of 
Midcal step one, there is clearly a difference between a statutory gap, as Chevron 
addresses, and identifying a legislative purpose, as Midcal emphasizes.  Chevron excuses 
all delegations, including those that are both implicit and explicit; Midcal only allows 
explicit delegations.  At the same time, it would be a mistake to end the judicial inquiry 
here, as if a clear statement approach can provide a full analysis.  Of course, clarity at 
step one can end the inquiry under Chevron, to the extent an agency renders an 
interpretation that contravenes clear statutory language, but identification of a clear 
legislative purpose, especially a clear purpose to delegate implementation of clear general 
goals to regulators, should not end the inquiry into whether a state action antitrust 
exception exists.  Where there is some kind of a delegation, a preference-eliciting penalty 
default rule is only the beginning; some clear articulation of purpose may be necessary, 
but it is not a sufficient basis for suspending judicial review of market conduct under the 
Sherman Act.  As I argue below, some evaluation of how the state engaged in regulatory 
oversight under a legislative delegation is also necessary.   
 
IV. MIDCAL’S STEP TWO: REASONS FOR FOREGOING ACTIVE-
SUPERVISION 
Step two of Chevron also can help courts to understand the state action antitrust 
defense especially in the context of state regulatory inaction.  As the U.S. Supreme Court 
stated in Ticor, and the Ninth Circuit embraced in Columbia Steel Casing, active 
supervision of state regulators’ conduct, as well as a clear statement of purpose, is 
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required in order to trigger a state action defense from antitrust enforcement.  However, 
many appellate courts remain astonishingly deferential to regulators in applying the 
active-supervision prong of the Midcal test.  Consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
pronouncements in the context of municipal regulation, these appellate courts effectively 
read out of state action antitrust doctrine any serious scrutiny of regulatory supervision, 
focusing instead on whether a decentralized legislative body has delegated authority to 
supervise private conduct to an agency.  In most cases, potential supervision of conduct 
alone has been sufficient to trigger a state action exemption from enforcement of the 
antitrust laws.200 
As I will argue, the mere potential for agency regulation, as may be present where 
a legislature has delegated authority to an agency, is never sufficient to extend a state 
action antitrust exemption.  Further, focusing on past regulatory actions alone in 
evaluating the state action exception can be misleading.  A focus on reasons provided by 
regulators, as a delegation-based approach to Chevron’s step two recommends, would 
allow courts to develop a more principled approach to state action antitrust defense cases, 
especially where they are reviewing private conduct that is not subject to regular 
government intervention. 
A.  The Necessity of an Active-Supervision Inquiry  
Some commentators argue that clear articulation of a policy to displace 
competition by a state-wide regulator should suffice for purposes of extending state 
action immunity.  As C. Douglas Floyd notes, “state agencies frequently do possess 
 
200 For example, potential regulation by a utility commission was found by the Tenth 
Circuit to be sufficient in the Trigen case, discussed supra notes 67-70 and accompanying 
text. 
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authority, as a matter of state law, to prescribe competition policy for the state as a whole 
under general delegations of authority from the state legislature.”201 Thus, he suggests, 
“the agency's clear articulation of state policy within the scope of its delegated authority 
should suffice in itself to satisfy the clear articulation component . . . .”202 
Within a state, as in other lawmaking processes, private interest groups frequently 
face incentives to lobby lawmakers to secure benefits, and may prefer open-ended 
regulatory schemes which leave details to be worked out by an agency firm-by-firm.  As 
Herbert Hovenkamp has observed, “Regulation by state and local government is not only 
pervasive, but it is also probably more susceptible to political influences than federal 
regulation is.”203 The more local the lawmaking process, the less costly it is for powerful 
interest groups to organize and influence the process, but the process can have serious 
spillover effects for non-participants.  At the local level, rent seeking may be more 
visible, but it also may be more stable, given the ability of private firms to exploit the 
political as well as the regulatory process.  Thus, if courts are to focus on the quality of 
the political process leading to enactment of a market restraint, the now defunct 
municipal-state distinction is sensible.  It would require courts to apply more scrutiny to 
local, as opposed to state, regulations in restraint of trade.   
While Floyd is correct that state and municipal process may demand different 
degrees of judicial scrutiny, his recommendation that state agencies be allowed to opt out 
of the antitrust law with a clear articulation alone throws the baby out with the bathwater.  
Allowing clear-articulation of a policy to suffice for purposes of bringing private conduct 
 
201 Floyd, supra note 184, at 1136.   
202 Id. 
203 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 335, 346. 
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outside of the scope of the antitrust laws would greatly broaden the scope of state action 
antitrust doctrine.  It would present particularly inviting immunity for industries in which 
state legislatures have made broad delegations to implement regulation to administrative 
agencies.  Moreover, it would encourage powerful industry-based interest groups to seek 
such broad delegations with little or no oversight under the antitrust laws.   
Rather than allow clear articulation to exempt state sovereigns from antitrust 
enforcement, much as Chevron step one ends the judicial review inquiry for federal 
agencies with clear statutory statements, a Chevron analysis informed by the economics 
of interest group decision making illustrates why, under Midcal, it is always necessary for 
a court to address the step two inquiry.  At the federal level, where interest group 
exploitation of the legislative process is less likely, it makes sense for courts to end their 
inquiry with an assessment of the consistency of a federal agency’s conduct with clear 
statutory language.  However, as politics move from the federal context to the state and 
local level, the economics of interest group decision making the prospect of strategic use 
of the lawmaking process more likely.  Firms might use the lawmaking process to extract 
clear statements as a strategy to opt out of antitrust enforcement, making it more likely 
that the process of such lawmaking will exclude interstate interests which suffer harms 
from anticompetitive conduct.  For this reason, under Midcal, unlike Chevron, it will 
always be necessary for a court to arrive at step two of the inquiry.   Courts that relax step 
two of the test take the Chevron deference analogy too far; the two steps of analysis in 
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Midcal differ structurally from Chevron given that state action antitrust doctrine is 
concerned with federal court deference to state, not federal, regulation.204 
As Ticor would suggest,205 it is incumbent on federal courts to take step two of 
the Midcal analysis seriously.  The Ninth Circuit has recognized the importance of active 
supervision in restructured network industries by applying Midcal in a way that contrasts 
markedly with the approaches of the Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh circuits.206 Columbia 
Steel Casing, a leading Ninth Circuit case on the topic, embraces a skeptical stance to a 
claim of a state action antitrust defense in a partially deregulated electric power 
market.207 There, the state of Oregon had clearly expressed a legislative policy to remove 
market competition by authorizing regulators to approve allocations of service 
territories.208 However, Midcal and Ticor suggest that what matters in judicial filtering in 
the consideration of antitrust claims is not only the legislature’s clarity in delegating to 
the regulator but also what the regulator does in exercising its discretion.  Recognizing 
this, the Ninth Circuit properly refused to extend a state action antitrust defense to a 
utility’s purported anticompetitive conduct in dividing Portland into exclusive service 
territories, given that regulators had not made firm-specific decisions to displace 
competition with regulation.209 Although the utility claimed that its conduct was 
consistent with previous contracts and orders, agreed to under generally delegated 
 
204 In this sense, a Chevron-type analysis of the state action antitrust exception leads me 
to a fundamentally different conclusion than Phil Weiser, who advocates higher levels of 
judicial Chevron deference to state regulators interpreting federal law.  See supra note 19. 
205 See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
206 See supra notes 67-108 and accompanying text. 
207 Columbia Steel Casing, Inc. v. Portland General Electric Co., 111 F.3d 1427 (9th Cir. 
1997). 
208 Id. at  1433 n.2. 
209 Id. at 1441-42.  
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ratemaking authority, the only way the regulator could have mandated service territories 
was pursuant to a statute under which the regulator had not acted.210 Mere “state 
authorization, approval, encouragement, or participation in restrictive private conduct 
confers no antitrust immunity,” the Ninth Circuit explained.211 
If a clear articulation of purpose alone were sufficient to provide a shield from the 
Sherman Act, this would create perverse incentives for interest groups in the state and 
local lawmaking process.  It would allow select, powerful private interests to lobby 
lawmakers for a delegation under a clear statutory language (however broad) and then 
engage in conduct that completely escapes the scrutiny of both agency regulators and 
courts – even where the conduct would otherwise be anticompetitive under the Sherman 
Act.  Thus, any delegation to state and local regulators must also be examined under step 
two of Midcal.
B.  Requiring Reasons for Inaction 
 
A Chevron analysis also sheds light on what the judicial assessment of active 
supervision should ideally entail.  Commentators writing on Chevron recognize that step 
one typically focuses on an agency’s authority, whereas step two assumes authority but 
focuses on the reasonableness of agency decision.212 In other words, only where 
Congress has not delegated authority to an agency, does a court even get to step two 
under Chevron.
Given that step one of the inquiry focuses on authority or jurisdiction, while step 
two focuses on reasonableness, it would seem unduly deferential if a court simply 
 
210 See id. at 1442.  
211 Id. at 1440-41 (quoting Phonetele, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716, 
736 (9th Cir. 1981) (other citations omitted)). 
212 See Seidenfeld, supra note 127; Levin, supra note 148. 
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deferred to any agency action that falls within the agency’s power to regulate.  In fact, for 
the same reason that courts must always arrive at step two of the state action inquiry, 
judicial deference to regulatory power, or the potential for regulation, without more 
invites interest group manipulation of the regulatory forum for enforcement of 
competition law.  The U.S. Supreme Court took a particularly egregious misstep in this 
direction in Motor Carriers, in which the U.S. Department of Justice accused truckers of 
horizontal price fixing.213 The Court rejected that antitrust claim under Midcal, on the 
grounds that state ratemaking commissions approved rate proposals prepared by truckers.  
It reasoned that mere authority to regulate, absent any legislative requirement214 or 
prearticulated criteria,215 is sufficient to extend a state action exception.  However, even 
where the legislative delegation at issue may be clear, it does not follow that the regulator 
has in fact exercised authority in ways that are consistent with its pre-articulated 
standards or, if there are none, with the pro-competitive goals of the Sherman Act.  
Allowing state action antitrust doctrine to preclude antitrust enforcement in such 
circumstances creates strong incentives for delegation to state regulators with little or no 
guarantee that such authority is exercised in ways that promote federalism or social 
welfare, let alone competition. 
If monopolistic conduct warrants any scrutiny under antitrust federalism, 
appellate courts must depart from their current and past practice of ignoring the active-
 
213 Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. U.S., 471 U.S. 48 (1985). 
214 Id. at 61 (Noting that “a state policy that expressly permits, but does not compel, 
anticompetitive conduct may be ‘clearly articulated’ within the meaning of Midcal.”) 
(emphasis in orginal). 
215 “The details of the inherently anticompetitive rate-setting process . . .  are left to the 
agency's discretion. The State Commission has exercised its discretion by actively 
encouraging collective ratemaking among common carriers.”  Id. at 64 
ANTITRUST PROCESS AND VERTICAL DEFERENCE 
- 74 -
supervision requirement.  Put simply, an opportunity for regulation is not the same as 
active supervision J although courts seem to consistently reach this conclusion.  The 
opportunity for regulation is a first step of the active-supervision analysis, but it hardly 
concludes it.216 
Ticor clarifies that courts must assess how frequently, and under what 
circumstances, supervisory authority is exercised by regulators.  For example, the Second 
Circuit correctly refused to extend a state action antitrust exemption to a challenge to an 
output cartel permitted by New York’s legislation implementing a tobacco settlement.217 
The legislation was clear and express in its purpose to implement market-share 
allocations in the sale of cigarettes, but the Second Circuit criticized the state for failing 
to articulate either a competitive or anticompetitive rationale for the policy.218 
Regardless of whether the clear-articulation requirement had been met, and whether the 
cartel was foreseeable under Hallie, the Second Circuit refused to extend a state action 
exemption due to a lack of active supervision, as is required by the second prong of 
Midcal. As the court observed, neither the New York statutes, the settlement, nor any 
other regulation envisioned active supervision of pricing under the cartel.  Given “no 
 
216 Raising a similar concern, the FTC Report of the State Action Task Force states, “One 
recurring problem involves the failure to distinguish between authorizing classes of 
activity and forming state policy to displace competition.”  FTC STATE ACTION REPORT,
supra note 4, at 26. 
217 Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004).   
218 Id. at 229-30.  The court was not convinced by the health benefit claims made by the 
state in the course of litigation, and observed that the only public discussion of the effect 
of the market-share provisions was to increase prices and to discourage young people 
from smoking – the precise type of cartel that the Sherman Act condemns.  Id. at 30.  In 
an order on rehearing, the court clarified: “a court must find under this [clear-articulation] 
prong that the state did not inadvertently include anticompetitive activities in some larger 
scheme.  For this reason, it is important that a state enunciate its intent to displace 
competition when it means to do so.”   Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 363 F.3d 149, 
156 (2d Cir. 2004) (order on rehearing). 
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mechanism” for reviewing the reasonableness of pricing decisions or monitoring market 
conditions,219 the court concluded “New York has failed to provide for any state 
supervision, much less active supervision, of the pricing conduct of cigarette 
manufacturers under the anticompetitive market structure . . . .”220 It further observed, 
“Absent such a program of supervision, there is no realistic assurance that a private 
party’s anticompetitive conduct promotes state policy, rather than merely the party’s 
individual interests.”221 
Recognizing the important role an active-supervision inquiry plays in antitrust 
federalism, the Ninth Circuit has also refused to apply a state action antitrust defense on 
this ground in the context of deregulated electric power markets.  The court allowed 
Snake River Valley Electric Association, an electrical cooperative, to sue an investor-
owned utility for anticompetitive refusing access to essential transmission facilities, 
rejecting the utility’s claim to a state action antitrust exemption.222 The utility argued that 
the state regulatory scheme clearly envisioned the utility refusing to wheel – to the extent 
the state had adopted a clear policy to displace competition among electric suppliers – but 
the Ninth Circuit did not allow this to trigger an antitrust defense.   Under Idaho state 
 
219 357 F.3d at 231. 
220 Id. at 232. 
221 Id. at 232 (quoting Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988)).  An earlier Third 
Circuit case reached a similar conclusion, noting that the state “lack oversight or 
authority over the tobacco manufacturers’ prices and production levels.  These decisions 
are left entirely to private actors.”  A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 263 
F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2001).  However, that same case extended Noerr-Pennington immunity 
to the settlement, noting that government settlements are no different in form from other 
types of legislative lobbying.  Id. at 253-54.  For criticism of this approach, see RICHARD 
A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 205-07 (2007).  For a popular 
press account of the significant financial stakes in this antitrust dispute, see Roger 
Parloff, Is the $200 Billion Tobacco Deal Going Up in Smoke?, FORTUNE, Mar. 7, 2005, 
at 136. 
222 Snake River Valley Elec. Ass’n v. Pacificorp, 238 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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law, the utility could decline the customer’s wheeling request without the substantive 
review of a state agency or state courts, but the court reasoned that “[t]his is the type of 
private regulatory power that the active-supervision prong of Midcal is designed to 
prevent.”223 Thus, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, a self-policing regulatory scheme may not 
require active supervision to qualify for a state action antitrust exemption,224 but where 
the regulator has discretion to exercise active supervision it is an appropriate inquiry for a 
court.  Similarly, perhaps signaling a departure from the deferential approach it 
previously had embraced in the electric power context,225 the Tenth Circuit refused to 
extend a state action antitrust defense to lock-up telephone contracts between 
Southwestern Bell that were “neither mandated, nor authorized, nor reviewed, nor even 
known” about by state regulators.226 
Cognizant of the potential gap that a low active-supervision threshold can create, 
some lower courts recognize that active supervision “would be satisfied if the state or 
state agencies held ratemaking hearings on a consistent basis.”227 Such an inference 
would be a good starting point for judicial analysis of the application of antitrust laws in a 
restructured network environment.  Courts have a long history of allowing the existence 
of consistent ratemaking hearings at the state or local level to give rise to a state action 
antitrust exemption.  In Ticor, for instance, the Supreme Court found it relevant that the 
 
223 Id.
224 Id. at 1194 (citing Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 344 n. 6 (1987) and FTC v. 
Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 640 (1992)). 
225 See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. 
226 Telecor Communications, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 305 F.3d 1124, 
1140 (10th Cir. 2002). 
227 See Green v. People’s Energy Corp., 2003-1 Trade Cases (CCH) ¶ 73,999 (N.D. Ill. 
2003) (finding active supervision where lengthy hearings were held on gas supplier’s 
rates on a consistent basis). 
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Wisconsin state regulatory body had not held rate hearings prior to approving on jointly 
filed insurance rate.228 Thus, extending a presumption of a state action antitrust 
exemption, and against judicial intervention, in the context of rate hearing is appropriate. 
Mere private contracts, however, do not meet this standard.  For example, a 
contract provision prohibiting a customer from entering into the electricity market as a 
competitor in the future, offered by a utility in exchange for a discounted rate, is not 
protected by the state action antitrust defense.229 For similar reasons, mere private filings 
of contracts or tariffs with a regulatory agency, without active regulatory scrutiny or 
oversight, would not meet the active-supervision requirement under a delegation-based 
account.  Without meaningful agency review of the specific private conduct at issue, the 
state action antitrust defense can be abused by private firms in a deregulatory 
environment.230 The factors that should guide courts include how frequently agencies 
monitor private activities, whether agencies have authority to enforce standards through 
the imposition of penalties, and whether agencies have adequate resources to engage in 
meaningful monitoring and enforcement.  When in doubt, if a regulatory system risks the 
imposition of spillover effects on non-participants, the presumption should be against 
invoking a state action antitrust defense. 
 
228 504 U.S. at 629-31. 
229 United States v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 4 F.Supp. 2d 172, 176 (W.D. N.Y. 
1998). 
230 As the FTC Report of the State Action Task Force observes: 
 
Active supervision requires the state to examine individual private conduct, 
pursuant to that [clearly articulated] regulatory regime, to ensure that it comports 
with that stated criterion.  Only then can the underlying conduct accurately be 
deemed that of the state itself, and political responsibility for the conduct fairly be 
placed with the state.   
 
FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 4, at 54. 
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Courts must be true to the overall federalism purposes of the state action antitrust 
exemption in interpreting the active-supervision requirement.  Fidelity to federalism 
would not limit assessment of supervision to state regulation only, but would also include 
other regulatory bodies, such as municipalities.  In addition, fidelity to federalism would 
require some attention to the process which gives rise to regulatory supervision.  If the 
purposes of regulatory action overlap with the overall consumer welfare goals of the 
Sherman Act, perhaps some degree of deference to supervision by the state or local 
regulator is appropriate.  However, if the purpose is blatantly protectionist, in ways that 
do not even arguably improve consumer welfare and that impose spillover costs on those 
in other jurisdictions who have not participated in the process leading to the adoption of 
regulation, intervention of the antitrust laws is entirely appropriate.  A preference-
eliciting default rule would align private incentives to ensure more explicit procurement 
of state action immunity via legislation and regulatory activity. 
In contrast to the Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit correctly 
makes an affirmative finding of active supervision by the regulator a predicate to any 
finding of a state action antitrust exemption, even in deregulated markets.  However, a 
more recent Ninth Circuit case addressing the state action antitrust defense in the very 
same antitrust claim illustrates how readily the active-supervision prong will be 
undermined if courts allow it to hinge entirely on the nature of the regulatory program 
approved by a state legislature rather than what regulators do in implementing that 
program.  On the heels of the court’s recognition that there was no state action defense in 
the first Snake River Valley Electric Association case,231 the Ninth Circuit extended state 
 
231 See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text. 
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action immunity to the same allegedly anticompetitive conduct.232 Following the first 
judicial finding of no state action, which allowed antitrust litigation to go forward, the 
Idaho legislature intervened by amending its Electric Supplier Stabilization Act, under 
which the utility had previously declined a wheeling request absent agency review.233 
The amendments allowed an electric supplier to refuse to wheel power if the requested 
wheeling “results in retail wheeling and/or a sham wholesale transaction,” subject to 
review of the state regulatory agency.234 In addition, the Idaho legislature prohibited 
competing suppliers from serving customers or former customers of other electric 
suppliers unless the competing supplier petitions the Idaho regulator and the regulator 
issues an order allowing the service.235 
In addressing this legislative intervention, the Ninth Circuit held that, unlike the 
previous statutory arrangement, which left the decision not to wheel entirely to private 
choice, the amended statute “has not left unregulated a private preserve without 
competition” and thus meets the active-supervision requirement for extending a state 
action antitrust exemption.236 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the Idaho statute 
precluded a private utility from wheeling without a contrary decision by the state 
regulator.237 The result of this ruling is that statutes and regulations that prohibit 
competitive conduct can eviscerate any active-supervision requirement.238 In effect, on 
 
232 Snake River Valley Electric Association v. PacifiCorp., 357 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
233 Id. at 1048. 
234 Idaho Code § 61-332D(1). 
235 Idaho Code §61-334B. 
236 Snake River Valley Elec. Ass’n, 357 F.3d at 1049. 
237 Id. at 1048-49. 
238 As was allowed by the Eleventh Circuit in the TEC Cogeneration case.  See supra 
notes 79-84 and accompanying text. 
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this approach if a private firm is successful in lobbying for a statute that prohibits it from 
engaging in competitive conduct, it would be immune from antitrust challenge, even if 
that legislation occurs in the context of a pending antitrust challenge.   
Recently, the FTC State Action Report elaborated on the benefits of a process 
based approach to assessing state active supervision in the state action context, as 
requiring:  a) “the development of an adequate factual record, including noticed and an 
opportunity to be heard”; b)  “a written decision on the merits”; and c) “a specific 
assessment – both qualitative and quantitative – of how private action comports with the 
substantive standards established by the state legislature.”239 While the FTC did not 
explicitly reference administrative law principles, the connection seems obvious and is 
worthy of attention by antitrust scholars, litigators and decisionmakers.  Paying attention 
to agency actions and history is a start to an active supervision inquiry, but a step two 
Chevron-type inquiry in state action antitrust analysis might give meaningful content to 
the process-based approach urged in the recent FTC State Action Report. Instead of 
focusing on actions, Chevron’s step two focuses on process and reasons.   In the antitrust 
context, if a state or local agency fails to provide basic standards for evaluating inaction, 
presumptively it would seem that antitrust enforcement should proceed.  Courts might 
create an exception where the actions of the regulator illustrate the regulator’s capacity 
and willingness to supervise markets.  These actions might include a history of regulatory 
intervention in setting rates or regulating industry structure, assuming this approach 
remains in effect.  However, absent reasons given ex ante by state or local officials, 
within the scope of the regulators’ discretion, courts should generally proceed to apply 
 
239 FTC STATE ACTION REPORT, supra note 4, at 55. 
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antitrust law to the private conduct at issue.  Where state or local officials provide reasons 
for inaction that are in tension with the goals of federal antitrust laws, courts should 
require those reasons to be given ex ante in the state regulatory forum, where they will be 
subject to judicial review.  Further, for purposes of extending a state action antitrust 
defense, a court should require those reasons to be consistent with the regulatory 
framework and to meet minimal reasonableness standards.   
For example, consider state and local bans on competition.  These bans exist in a 
variety of industries, but perhaps they are most visible in industries such as electric 
power, where competition exists in the deregulated wholesale market, but retail markets 
are left to the discretion of state regulators.  Many states have banned retail electric power 
competition outright, allowing incumbent electric utilities, regulated under traditional 
cost-of-service principles, to provide service without the competitive threat of new 
entrants.  To date, such bans on retail competition have avoided antitrust challenge under 
the Sherman Act given the state action exception.240 
However, casting the antitrust state action exception as focusing on delegation 
issues suggests that, while state and local governments have considerable leeway to ban 
competition in various industries, competition bans are not prima facie valid.  Under a 
delegation approach, the significance of competition bans will depend on who – a
legislature or a regulatory agency J makes the basic decision to ban competition.  A state 
legislature can, as a sovereign body, make that decision without itself providing reasons, 
assuming that whatever ban it enacts is self-executing and not contingent on decisions 
 
240 See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text (discussing the Eleventh Circuit’s 
opinion in TEC Cogeneration). 
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delegated to governmental agencies or private parties.241 At the same time, if a 
competition ban enacted by a state legislature is intended to undermine national markets, 
extending a state action exception to antitrust enforcement would be inappropriate under 
the Supremacy Clause.  For example, in operation state bans on competition may pose a 
conflict with national regulatory approaches (such as the deregulated wholesale 
market).242 To the extent this is so, if state regulators have failed to address this conflict 
or to pursue legitimate state regulatory objectives, federal courts should be wary of a 
private firm’s invocation of a state action antitrust defense even by the state legislature.   
At the same time, a delegation approach recognizes that there must be some outer 
limit on legislative decisions to ban competition.  For example, if a legislative decision to 
 
241 As I have argued elsewhere, the dormant commerce clause can serve as the outer limit 
for such exercises of legislative power, such as where a state legislature imposes spillover 
costs on those who do not have the opportunity to participate in the lawmaking process.  
See Jim Rossi, Political Bargaining and Judicial Intervention in Constitutional and 
Antitrust Federalism, 83 WASH. U.L.Q. 521 (2005).  There I also argue that courts 
examine spillover effects of regulation and legislation in assessing whether to extend the 
state action exception by focusing on the lawmaking process.  Id. at 567-68.  My proposal 
there is similar to Squire’s focus on the fairness of process as a basis for scrutinizing state 
regulations that set prices, see supra note 109, but this Article’s emphasis on the 
delegation issues presented in state and local regulatory processes clearly advises in favor 
of more aggressive judicial scrutiny in other regulatory contexts than his proposal would 
endorse. 
242 The Federal Trade Commission has identified several ways in which the failure of 
state regulators to conform to wholesale markets, represented at the extreme by states that 
have banned retail competition to favor traditional rate regulation, limit the benefits of 
competition from wholesale electric power restructuring.  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION PERSPECTIVES ON ELECTRIC POWER 
REGULATORY REFORM: FOCUS ON RETAIL COMPETITION (September 2001), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/elec/electricityreport.pdf. For example, state restrictions on 
power plant and transmission line siting have limited the benefits from regional 
wholesale power markets.  Id. at 22-28.  State standard offer service programs have 
impaired new entrants and limited the benefits of wholesale competition for retail 
customers, especially smaller residential customers.  Id. at 43-51.  Stranded cost recovery 
allowed by state regulators has also preserved the grip over consumer welfare held by 
traditional state monopolists while they simultaneously benefit from wholesale 
competition.  Id. at 51-55. 
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ban competition also authorizes collusive behavior among private actors, private 
delegation concerns are implicated and judicial scrutiny is warranted.243 Where a 
competition ban operates within the context of a governmental delegation, as did Idaho’s 
ban (which allowed state regulators to exercise discretion to grant exceptions),244 the 
state’s decision to ban competition warrants careful scrutiny.  It would seem that the most 
democratically elected officials within a state government, such as a state legislature or 
governor, should have the authority to ban state or local competition without providing 
elaborate reasons ex ante.  Yet, where there is less majoritarian accountability (as may 
exist when state or local agency regulators given reasons), there is also much more to be 
gained from a judicially-imposed reason-giving requirement.  At a minimum, a state 
regulatory agency should be expected to articulate such reasons – either ex ante (before 
adopting a competitive ban) or post hoc (such as in an amicus brief) – as a condition to a 
court approving the extension of an antitrust state action exception. 
Another problem that the reason-giving approach to state action exception can 
help courts to address is market-based tariffs.  In several contexts, including natural gas, 
electric power and telecommunications regulation, federal regulators have replaced 
traditional cost-of-service regulation (which set service prices based on costs following 
an elaborate hearing) with so called “market-based rates” – tariffs filed by firms that are 
approved by federal regulators based on non-cost criteria, frequently without any public 
 
243 As Herbert Hovenkamp observes, “a state could not simply pass a statute authorizing 
building contractors to fix prices and then leave them free to do so entirely on their own.”  
HOVENKAMP, supra note 55, at 233. 
244 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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hearing on the setting of the firm’s price.245 Such tariffs allow firms the flexibility to 
respond to market forces, while also allowing regulators some opportunity to monitor 
prices and terms of service in order to protect the public interest.246 Federal courts have 
addressed the appropriateness of antitrust litigation where federal courts accept such 
tariffs, adopting a very deferential approach to regulators – one that seems to allow the 
stamp of federal regulatory approval of market rates to serve as a “filed rate” defense to 
antitrust litigation.247 State regulators have also begun to implement market-based rates 
in many contexts.248 For example, Texas has implemented a market-based rate filing 
system in its deregulated electric power market, in which firm prices are set based on 
market transactions rather than following a traditional cost-of-service hearing.   A federal 
district court in Texas rejected an antitrust challenge to allegedly monopolistic behavior 
of a firm based on the claim that Texas’ regulatory system provided sufficient regulatory 
oversight to invoke a filed rate defense.249 While the district court relied on the filed rate 
 
245 See David B. Spence, The Politics of Electricity Restructuring: Theory v. Practice, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 417 (2005) (describing adoption of market-based retail rates for 
electric power at the state level). 
246 See Jeffrey McIntyre Gray, Reconciling Market-Based Rates with the Just and 
Reasonable Standard, 26 ENERGY L.J. 423 (2005) (noting that a presumption of “just and 
reasonable” rates should attach where there is evidence of competitive markets at the 
time of contract formation, but that if rebutted a review of market-based rates may be 
appropriate); Gerald Norlander, May the FERC Rely on Markets to Set Electric Rates?,
24 ENERGY L.J. 65 (2003) (arguing that FERC’s market-based rate policy violates the 
Federal Power Act’s requirement that regulators allow only “just and reasonable” rates). 
247 See Town of Norwood v. New England Power Co., 202 F.3d 408 (1st Cir. 2000).  The 
filed rate defense differs from the state action exception in that it focuses on horizontal 
(not vertical) conflicts between courts and federal (not state) regulators.  In a previous 
article, I have argued that such an absolutist approach to the filed rate defense in antitrust 
claims is flawed.  See Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial Enforcement 
for a Deregulatory Era, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1591 (2003).  
248 See Spence, supra note 245.   
249 Texas Commercial Energy v. TXU Energy, Inc., 413 F.3d 503, 508 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(stating that “courts have consistently applied the filed rate doctrine in a number of 
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doctrine, the court was wrong to apply this defense to shield the private firm from 
antitrust scrutiny based on state or local regulatory action – as the firm’s defense involved 
a claim that there is a vertical, not a horizontal, regulatory conflict.250 If such issues are 
properly addressed as delegation issues within the state action antitrust exception, federal 
courts will be more likely to protect against abuses of monopoly power.  Presumably, 
market-based filing systems are based on pro-competitive goals – goals that are generally 
co-extensive with the purposes of the Sherman Act.  However, market-based rate file-
and-approve system give little record for evaluation, other than the ex ante criteria for 
tariff approval articulated by regulators (if any exist).  In reviewing the appropriateness of 
a state action exception based on this regulatory approach, federal courts need to assess 
whether the rationales given at the time of state/local approval of state/local market-based 
rates are consistent with pre-articulated pro-competitive policies.  If no such policies have 
 
energy cases to preclude lawsuits against companies based on rates that were filed with a 
government agency.”).  Even though Texas regulation was at issue, the Fifth Circuit cited 
exclusively to cases involving federal, not state, regulators.  See Keogh v. Chicago & 
Northwestern Railway Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922) (applying the filed rate doctrine as a 
defense in an antitrust case where the allegedly anticompetitive conduct was sanctioned 
by a tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission); Square D Co. v. Niagara 
Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409 (1986) (same). These filed rate cases invoke 
the filed rate doctrine based on the notion that federal regulation preempts state 
regulation or makes federal judicial assessment unnecessary; however, there was no 
federal regulation at issue in the case.  The Fifth Circuit did not examine whether and 
how state regulation presents a conflict with the Sherman Act. 
250 For criticism of this Texas district court decision for emphasizing the wrong 
regulatory axis, see Jim Rossi, Debilitating Doctrine: How the Filed-Rate Policy Wreaks 
Havoc—And What Courts Can Do About It, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, November 
2004, at 16 (suggesting that the decision should have been decided under the state action 
exception – not the filed rate doctrine).  Unfortunately, in hearing the appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit made precisely the same mistake – effectively endorsing a broad filed rate 
defense to deal with federal-state conflicts where the issue should have been addressed as 
a state action exception, which explicitly would pays attention to accountability in the 
state regulatory process.  Interestingly, neither the district court opinion nor the Fifth 
Circuit addressed the state action exception. 
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been articulated, it is beyond the role of federal courts to provide them – nor should state 
and local regulators be allowed to provide such rationales in amicus briefs post hoc.  
Perhaps the most challenging new issue in applications of the state action 
exception is disclosure and monitoring programs.  Just as disclosure and monitoring 
programs are increasingly popular at the federal level, many state and local regulators 
have experimented with the same approach in traditional and new regulatory scenarios.251 
For example, energy suppliers in deregulated electric power markets are frequently 
required to register and file reports with regulators regarding their market activities.  If a 
state requires the disclosure of information for purposes of market monitoring, the 
fundamental question in deciding whether to extend state action immunity hinges on the 
 
251 In addition to states that continue to require reporting for traditional electric utilities 
using market-based rates, disclosure requirements for suppliers range from reporting 
information to regulators about pricing and information about generation, distribution, 
and transmission, to labeling laws that require the disclosure of fuel content.  Many states 
also require registration and reporting for intermediate market actors, including 
aggregators, marketers, and brokers.  For example, the Virginia registration summary is 
online at http://www.vaenergychoice.org/suppliers/suppliers.asp and a summary of many 
of these licensing requirements is online at http://www.distributed-
generation.com/licensing.htm. For a more complete description of such requirements, 
see RICHARD P. SEDANO, ELECTRIC PRODUCT DISCLOSURE: A STATUS REPORT (National 
Council on Competition and the Electric Industry 2002), available at 
http://www.ncouncil.org/pdfs/disclosure_final.pdf. This is clearly a major shift in the 
role of state regulators in this industry, from traditional rate hearings to information 
gathering, monitoring, investigation and, at the extreme, whistle blowing or enforcement..  
These examples from state electric power regulation are a small part of a larger emphasis 
on disclosure as a regulatory approach in this and other industries.  See Charles Koch, 
Collaborative Governance in the Restructured Electricity Industry, 40 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 589, 610 (2005) (emphasizing the need for state regulators to transform themselves 
from traditional price regulators to “investigative/disclosure” vehicles and “ultimate 
monitors/whistleblowers”); Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.Org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will 
Not Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205, 239-40 
(2004) (describing state attorney general registration and disclosure programs for 
nonprofit solicitation).  See also Donald F. Santa, Jr., Who Needs What, and Why?  
Reporting and Disclosure Requirements in Emerging Competitive Electricity Markets, 21
ENERGY L.J. 1 (2000) (describing a new class of disclosure requirements at the federal 
and state levels).   
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standards state officials apply in monitoring and deciding to enforce against firms that 
have disclosed information to regulators.  For example, a group of private firms might 
disclose their participation in joint rate making activities.  If the regulator did not act to 
prohibit the practice, the firms could claim antitrust immunity.  At core, this type of 
problem challenges courts to examine state and local regulatory inaction, to decide if it is 
consistent with broader antitrust goals – paralleling calls that federal courts review 
agency inaction for arbitrariness at step two of Chevron.252 To the extent a regulator’s 
disclosure-and-monitoring standards are consistent with competition (i.e., pro-market, as 
is frequently the case with state plans designed to enhance competition), a federal court 
can review them for overlap with federal antitrust enforcement and should only extend a 
state action defense to the extent it is coextensive with the goals of the Sherman Act.  If, 
on the other hand, a disclose-and-monitor program is inconsistent in its approach with the 
competitive goals of the Sherman Act, the fundamental inquiry should focus on whether a 
state/local agency gives reasons for failing to enforce that are consistent with its pre-
articulated criteria to either displace competition or regulate it.  If a state has no pre-
articulated criteria, or if those criteria are only expressed ex post, a federal court should 
refuse to extend the state action exception.   
 
CONCLUSION 
In terms of remedy, under the delegation account advanced in this Article, a 
failure to apply the state action antitrust exception has less significant consequences than 
other judicial review of legislation or regulation.  It does not result in condemning public 
 
252 See Bressman, supra note 145. 
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conduct or necessarily striking state or local legislation.  It also does not require anything 
specific of state officials, other than the provision of reasons where state regulators wish 
to allow firms to escape antitrust scrutiny.253 Nor does it result in vacation or reversal 
and remand, as may occur under Chevron. Instead, a failure to extend the state action 
exception merely subjects private conduct to judicial evaluation under the antitrust laws.  
Such an approach preserves federalism values by protecting the type of democratic 
participation that forms the core of federalism.  It also reduces the incentive for private 
interest groups to quietly lobby state and local regulators in ways that allow state action 
doctrine to become a forum shopping strategy for private firms to opt out of antitrust 
enforcement. 
While accountability-driven, this proposal is not intended to interpret the Sherman 
Act as a free-roaming invitation to federal judges to impose their own political 
accountability ideals onto state and local governments.  First and foremost, the antitrust 
laws are about competition and efficiency in private markets.  Often, however, industries 
face a mix of private and public ordering; the state action exception defines that mix 
where state or local regulation is at issue.  Nothing in the history of the Sherman Act 
indicates that political accountability was its primary goal, but if the judicially-fashioned 
 
253 The Tenth Amendment does not pose a barrier to a process-based account of the state 
action antitrust exception, given that no state or local regulatory action is compelled and 
that it is democracy-promoting at the state and local level.  Printz v. United States 
establishes clearly that Congress or federal regulators cannot “commandeer” state 
officials by requiring them to act.  521 U.S. 898 (1997).  Under the delegation account of 
the state action exception presented in this Article, state officials may still choose not to 
articulate reasons and may refuse to file briefs in federal antitrust cases.  Even if they do 
so, the state or local regulatory program still would survive under both federal and state 
law to the extent it is not inconsistent with federal antitrust law.  However, if the 
approach proposed in this Article were adopted, the silence or inaction of state or local 
officials clearly would have consequences for private firms invoking the regulatory 
program as a basis for a state action exception from antitrust enforcement.     
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state action exception fails to heed accountability this could come at the cost of the 
explicit goals of competition law.  While state or local governments have the choice to 
embrace monopoly over competition, Congress could not have intended to encourage 
private firms that wish to avoid federal antitrust scrutiny to hide behind the veil of state or 
local government approval without some transparency and accountability for public 
decisions, as this would allow state and local governments to facilitate antitrust violations 
with no scrutiny at all.254 In addition, paying attention to political accountability 
advances at least one articulation of the primary goals of the antitrust laws: that Congress 
sought to protect competition by smaller firms for purposes of ensuring that large firms 
with monopoly power do not dominate the political process, especially at the state and 
local level, where powerful firms are more likely to thwart lawmaking that maps 
majoritarian preferences.  In this sense, market competition may have been designed to 
encourage not just any private arrangement but those that are most consistent with 
increased political accountability.255 The approach urged in this Article limits assessment 
of political accountability issues to antitrust defenses, promoting judicial economy and 
leaving adjudication of substantive offenses to focus on the other goals of antitrust law, 
such as promoting consumer welfare and substantive efficiency.  Even if the more 
ambitious proposal of viewing the defense entirely through a process lens is not endorsed, 
 
254 This implication of broad state action immunity is discussed supra at Part I. 
255 See Elhauge, supra note 12 (proposing a process-based interpretation of antitrust law);  
Pitofsky, supra note 56 (urging a populist interpretation of the Sherman Act for political 
legitimacy reasons). 
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the Article has advanced the case for requiring attention to procedure as an evidentiary 
predicate to making a decision to extend the state action exception on other grounds.256 
Casting state action issues as a type of vertical deference requiring reasons 
provides a way for federal courts to reconcile competition policy with state regulation 
without sacrificing political accountability at the state and local level or undermining the 
goals of antitrust law.  If courts addressing state action exception issues were to draw on 
the delegation principles that inform Chevron and its application, antitrust law would be 
much better equipped to deal with the issues presented by inaction in state and local 
regulation, particularly as industries such as insurance, health care, energy and 
telecommunications are restructured to enhance competition. 
 
256 For example, the signaling function that is served by hard look review of state or local 
regulation could be help courts to evaluate whether a state sovereign sees the benefits of a 
regulatory program as justifying the costs.  See Stephenson, supra note 147.  Such an 
approach would aid courts in making decisions under Squire’s preemption approach.  See 
supra note 109 (describing how Squire incorporates process considerations into his 
substantive preemption analysis). 
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ABSTRACT 
Courts struggle with the tension between national competition laws, on the one 
hand, and state and local regulation, on the other – especially as traditional governmental 
functions are privatized and as economic regulation advances beyond its traditional role 
to address market monitoring.  This Article defends a process-based account of the state 
action antitrust exception against alternative interpretations, such as the substantive 
efficiency preemption approach recently advanced by Richard Squire, and elaborates on 
what such a process-based account would entail for courts addressing the role of state 
economic regulation as a defense in antitrust cases.  It recasts the debate as focused 
around delegation issues and judicial deference to regulation – traditionally issues of 
administrative law.  State action antitrust exception issues frequently are invoked where 
state officials fail to act or only act partially to regulate, as is increasingly common where 
states privatize governmental functions or attempt to deregulate, or implement 
competition policies of their own.  As I shall argue, in such contexts a delegation model, 
which focuses on the conditions under which state legislative bodies have made 
delegations, whether agency regulators have standards, and the reasons provided by state 
and local officials for regulatory inaction, provides a more powerful and principled 
approach for evaluating the interaction between regulation and antitrust litigation than 
alternative approaches.   
 
A process-based account of the state action exception recognizes federalism and 
efficiency as important values, but changes the primary emphasis of the judicial inquiry.  
Federalism values and economic efficiency may well be advanced by applications of the 
state action exception, but that does not require courts to ground their decisions in 
individual cases entirely on federal preemption legal analysis or on an assessment of the 
substantive efficiency of state or local regulation.  On a process-based account, 
federalism goals could be advanced by state and local political processes as much as by 
federal courts attempting to identify and apply the substantive values in broad federal 
statutes such as the Sherman Act.  Moreover, a process-based account of antitrust 
defenses, such as the state action exception, recognizes the possibility that economic 
efficiency can inform the application of the substantive standards of antitrust law without 
requiring economic efficiency to be the primary focus in evaluating every governmental 
program, particularly at the state and local level.  By discouraging courts from directly 
addressing economic efficiency concerns before addressing the merits of an antitrust 
violation, such an approach promotes judicial economy and, if properly cabined, can also 
have a positive effect on the behavior of private groups in the lawmaking process.  Even 
within alternative accounts that give priority to federalism or economic efficiency, the 
delegation approach should be used to inform the evidentiary assessment of procedure, 
serving as predicate any judicial decision to extend a state action antitrust exception. 
 
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I discusses the problems with current 
formulations and applications of the antitrust state action exception, which no one finds 
satisfactory.  As I argue, traditional approaches, such as a federal preemption-oriented 
understanding of state action doctrine, have serious limitations given a state and local 
regulatory environment that is increasingly characterized by regulatory transition and 
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inaction.  Part II introduces Chevron, the predominant paradigm for judicial review of 
regulation in administrative law, highlighting its delegation structure and aspects of it that 
are useful to understanding the problems state regulation present for antitrust law.  Part 
III explains limits to the analogy between Chevron step one and the clear articulation 
requirement for antitrust state action.  Part IV draws an analogy to step two of Chevron 
and analyzes the implications of recasting the state action antitrust exception to focus on 
agency reasons, not power or history.  The Article concludes by addressing the kinds of 
reasons that should suffice for purposes of addressing active regulatory supervision at the 
state and local level as a predicate to extending an antitrust state action exception. 
 
